U.S. Navy warships transit the Arabian Sea in close formation as CENTCOM forces continue to promote regional security and stability, June 30, 2026. (U.S. Navy photo)

1. President Trump announced on Tuesday that a new U.S.-Iran-Oman deal to open the Strait of Hormuz could be reached this week after the White House backed down from launching major strikes against Iran. We break down what policymakers can do to strengthen U.S. pressure on Iran. 👇

• An olive branch: Late last week, the United States and Israel were reportedly planning massive joint strikes against Iran. But then on Saturday night, President Trump announced he would “cancel the attack, subject to being able to rapidly make a DEAL.” The President said this would include reopening the strait and an end to Iran’s nuclear threat. Specifically, Axios reported the deal would set up a 60-day extendable arrangement to ensure safe, toll-free navigation of the strait. Nonetheless, Iranian leadership is being recalcitrant as usual, telling Reuters it will seek fees of 5-7% of the price of cargoes from ships using the strait. The deal also aims to resume the U.S.-Iran ceasefire and restart nuclear negotiations.
• Déjà vu? If these reports are accurate, then the forthcoming deal may not be too dissimilar from the previous June U.S.-Iran Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). This raises the question: Why would Iran observe the terms of this deal when it flagrantly violated the last one? For Trump’s part, he noted this time could be different, because it was not just a bluff: “we were ready to go.” It is true that Tehran will not acquiesce to U.S. demands unless it perceives a real threat. That is why success will require Washington to not let up U.S. pressure on any front until it secures meaningful concessions from Tehran, explains FDD’s Richard Goldberg. We outline key lessons from the last MOU and how to prevent a Groundhog Day deal.
• Stay the course: Reportedly, Trump’s decision not to strike Iran over the weekend came after the Saudi Crown Prince implored him to back down. This intervention reflects Saudi Arabia’s desire not to risk widening the war even though Riyadh believes it would benefit from a weakened Tehran, explains FDD’s Jonathan Schanzer. The Saudis’ calls for diplomacy also run contrary to Iranian leadership’s blatant lack of interest and bad-faith approach to negotiations. Indeed, Schanzer points out that each time an agreement has been brokered, the regime has acted aggressively in the strait or attacked our Gulf allies. At this point, “The president should send our allies in Riyadh a clear message: It’s time to either join the fight, foot the bill, or get out of the way,” Schanzer adds.
• Avoid vague language: If the new U.S.-Iran deal comes to fruition, it must resolve the June MOU’s sequencing flaw. That agreement saw economic concessions to Iran precede the beginning of serious nuclear negotiations, rather than as a reward for finishing them, explains FDD’s Miad Maleki. With concessions in hand and U.S. leverage ceded, Tehran was free to read every vague provision in the most expansive way possible. For any new agreement to be truly performance-based, it must flip the script and only offer economic relief as a result of verified compliance. “The lesson from the first MOU is simple: ambiguity is not neutral,” concludes Maleki. A new deal will only succeed if it denies Tehran the chance to weaponize the text.
• Max out economic pressure: On the economic front, the administration has yet to go all-in on maximum pressure and, therefore, has yet to maximize its negotiating leverage. Washington should target the financial institutions that enable Iranian sanctions evasion at scale, explains FDD’s Max Meizlish. Indeed, “Not a single bank in Hong Kong or Dubai has been designated despite years of involvement in Iran-linked transactions,” Meizlish writes. Treasury has likewise never used Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act against individual banks to impose enhanced due diligence requirements on foreign financial institutions that pose a high risk of facilitating Iranian sanctions evasion. “For the ‘maximum pressure’ bumper sticker to deliver on its promise,” Meizlish advises, “Washington must move beyond one-off strikes and piecemeal sanctions.” It requires something far more comprehensive.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy speaking at a joint press conference with NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, Jun. 3, 2026. (NATO Official photo)

2. Ukraine has no missile interceptors left, Kyiv announced this week, leaving it more vulnerable to Russian strikes and underscoring the need for greater U.S. air defense support. Meanwhile, Congress can do its part by making Russia’s war on Ukraine too costly to sustain.

• Air defenses depleted: A Russian barrage targeting Kyiv and the surrounding region on Wednesday amounted to one of the deadliest attacks on the city and its environs this year, killing 17 people and injuring 44. Ukraine was unable to intercept a single one of the 28 missiles Russia launched at it as the country grapples with a perilous shortage of Patriot interceptors — its only reliable defense against such attacks. And Moscow is pushing its advantage, carrying out similar mass bombardments over the past week that saw few missile interceptions. President Zelenskyy drew a clear connection between the interceptor shortage and rising civilian casualties in comments following Wednesday’s attacks, saying, “Ballistic missile interceptors could have saved the lives of those killed today.”
• Moscow’s missile strategy: Already one of Moscow’s few remaining advantages in the eyes of Ukrainian leadership, the threat of Russia’s ballistic missiles is amplified by Ukraine’s shortage of Patriot interceptors. Eager to exploit this vulnerability, Moscow has invested in increasing missile production going into winter. As it has in previous years, the Kremlin is likely to target civilian energy infrastructure, which Ukrainians rely on to survive the country’s brutal winters, says FDD’s RADM (Ret.) Mark Montgomery. Washington would be wise to remove that card from Putin’s hand if it is serious about brokering a settlement, urges FDD’s John Hardie.
• Stop missiles before launch: While Ukraine’s bid to produce its own Patriot interceptor missiles had gained U.S. approval, that effort would take years to come to fruition and is now in doubt. In the meantime, “A small change in U.S. policy would make a big difference in Ukraine’s fight for survival,” explains Montgomery. Already approved for sale to Ukraine, air-launched Extended Range Attack Munitions (ERAMs) would let Kyiv strike ballistic-missile launchers without putting pilots at unacceptable risk. However, they cannot reach their full potential unless the U.S. Air Force integrates them with the Ukrainian F-16’s weapons systems.
• Unlock Starlink’s potential: To ease the interceptor shortfall, Ukraine is also pushing for permission to use Starlink to target ballistic missile launchers inside Russia. Should Washington take up Kyiv’s cause and SpaceX acquiesce, it would unlock “one of the best options the United States has to help Ukraine protect its cities amid a shortage of Patriot air defense munitions,” Hardie writes. This would pave the way for Ukraine to use Starlink-equipped loitering munitions or reconnaissance drones to “free hunt” Russian-based mobile launchers that can quickly displace after firing.
• Force Putin’s hand: The Senate has done its part to drain Russia’s war chest by passing the bipartisan Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026 (S. 5025 / H.R. 5334) by a wide margin of 86-11. Ukraine has already re-taken the initiative, and this new sanctions legislation could compound Moscow’s deepening economic issues. The bill would leverage targeted tariffs to pressure the top five purchasers of Russian energy and top facilitators of Russian sanctions evasion to stop funding Russia’s war machine. As Washington seeks to restart Russia-Ukraine peace talks, these measures could make Russia’s war of aggression too costly to sustain and strengthen America and Ukraine’s hand.
• Read More: We laid out the Myths vs. Facts of the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026 on our website here.

President Trump participates in a Board of Peace meeting at the Donald J. Trump Institute of Peace in Washington, D.C., Feb. 19, 2026. (Official White House Photo by Daniel Torok)

1. The U.S.-led Board of Peace (BoP) announced a 15-point roadmap to disarm Hamas and transfer governing authority in Gaza late last week. But its success will depend on its sequencing and whether more comprehensive steps toward deradicalization are taken.

• A terror-free zone: The roadmap would see civilian and security governance transferred from Hamas to the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG), a BoP-supervised group of Palestinian technocrats. Under the roadmap, Israel and Hamas would cease military operations immediately, a period extendable by the International Verification Committee. After this, the NCAG would enter Gaza and begin assuming control of the government. Once deployed, the NCAG will begin the gradual decommissioning and storing of Hamas weaponry, which would be linked to a phased withdrawal of Israeli forces.
• The key to disarmament: Just after the roadmap was agreed to, Hamas’s lead negotiator attempted to rewrite the deal, instead demanding an immediate Israeli withdrawal to the positions the IDF controlled before the October ceasefire. This, of course, would allow Hamas to continue its rearmament and recruitment, but it would also take the only credible enforcement mechanism off the table. “International forces may monitor compliance, deliver humanitarian assistance and train Palestinian security forces,” warn FDD’s Mark Dubowitz and Ben Cohen. “But we should harbor no illusions that they will confront Hamas if it refuses to disarm or begins to rearm.” If Israel cannot act decisively against a reconstituting Hamas, the roadmap will undermine the very security it seeks to create.
• Deradicalization is needed: Disarmament alone cannot solve the deeper problem of decades of anti-Israel and antisemitic poison in Palestinian education. Any serious plan for Gaza must include a comprehensive strategy for deradicalization. In addition to enforceable disarmament, success will depend on “uprooting the ideology that has sustained Hamas for generations,” explain Dubowitz and Cohen. Without taking these steps, Hamas could simply bide its time, rebuild its networks, and wait to mobilize a new generation of terrorists.

Congress has a role: As the BoP roadmap unfolds, there are several questions Congress should ask:

• “Who will account for weapons in Hamas possession?” Washington must ensure that weapons go to the NCAG, and not the Palestinian Authority, so that they can be verifiably decommissioned.
• “What is the U.S. contingency plan if the vetted and NCAG-trained Palestinian police force cannot secure areas fast enough to prevent a security vacuum?” Since the International Stabilization Force is not the one policing Gaza, there must be a mechanism to prevent terrorists from filling that vacuum.
• “What statutory mechanism will give Congress visibility into U.S. contributions?” Congress has an important role to play in ensuring U.S. funds are spent wisely and effectively. It is critical that members conduct oversight of these plans.

President Trump participates in a welcome ceremony with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan ahead of the NATO Summit in Ankara, Turkey, Jul. 7, 2026. (Official White House Photo by Daniel Torok)

2. The Justice Department announced the arrest of a Turkey-based director of a sham charity last week for conspiring to help Hamas, further exposing Turkey’s continued engagement with terrorists.

• Countering terrorist financing: The defendant allegedly used his senior role to help procure and distribute funds and supplies to Gaza in coordination with a senior Hamas leader. He faces U.S. charges of conspiracy to provide material support to Hamas and financing terrorism. This is but the latest Turkish individual to use a private organization as cover to supply Hamas with money and materiel. Just a few months ago, the Treasury Department identified three Turkish nonprofits that also served as fronts for Hamas fundraising.
• The Turkey-Hamas friendship: Turkish support for Hamas is not limited to private organizations. Ankara has hosted numerous senior Hamas leaders and serves as a sanctuary from which the group plots terror attacks in the West Bank, note FDD’s Natalie Ecanow and Sinan Ciddi. Even today, Turkish officials openly court the group. Turkey’s Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan met Hamas leader Khalil al-Hayya just last week to congratulate him “on his appointment” as political chief. These ties are especially alarming given that Turkey sits on the Board of Peace, the body charged with overseeing Hamas’s disarmament. Its position could allow Ankara to stymie peace efforts on behalf of its terrorist friends.
• Keep targeting Hamas in Turkey: The Trump administration should keep targeting persons and entities in Turkey that enable Hamas, recommend Ecanow and Ciddi. Washington should also withhold advanced U.S. weaponry from Ankara so long as it shelters the group. “A NATO ally with an intelligence chief who congratulates Hamas’s leader and with banks and charities that keep surfacing on OFAC’s sanctions list should not be entrusted with the F-35 or the F-110 engines it seeks for its Kaan fighter,” advise Ecanow and Ciddi.

Launch of a PAC-3 MSE, a highly sought-after air defense munition, in Huntsville, Alabama, Jul. 1, 2024. (Official U.S. Army photo by Darrell Ames)

3. The Pentagon signed two framework agreements to expand the production capacity of critical missile-interceptor components this week amid reports of dwindling missile stockpiles.

• Signing supply chain deals: The Pentagon said the agreements would support the production of the Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) to triple and quadruple, respectively. More broadly, they will support the Pentagon’s long-term goal of procuring nearly 14,000 PAC-3 and THAAD interceptors. The agreements aim to give the entire supply chain the stability and predictable demand necessary to scale production.
• Pentagon shifts approach: These agreements come as the Pentagon is attempting to transform its weapons-procurement process by focusing on multiple vendors, greater competition, and multiyear procurements that create sustained demand and private investment. If successful, this push would help replenish strained U.S. missile inventories depleted during the conflict with Iran. According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, since the war with Iran began, the United States has expended just under half of our THAAD interceptors and some two-thirds of its Patriot interceptors. Restoring this inventory will take time, making sustained production essential to America’s ability to defend itself and its allies well into the future.
• Build it out: The framework agreements are a welcome step but should be built out into a more formal policy, FDD Action’s Tyler Stapleton tells us. As U.S. operations around Iran continue, Washington must replenish depleted stockpiles to protect U.S. servicemembers, bases, and allies from Iranian missiles and drones. “Private industry should be incentivized by the Department of War and Congress to ramp up production while this national security threat remains,” Stapleton urges.

A C-17 Globemaster III sits parked on the ramp at the Royal Air Force base in Akrotiri, Cyprus, as pallets of humanitarian civil assistance wait in the foreground. (Photo by Tech. Sgt. Chuck Marsh, USAF)

Close the manifest transparency gap.

Congress should extend the public manifest-disclosure requirements that already govern ocean shipping to air, truck, and rail cargo. Roughly half of what enters the United States now arrives by these modes, yet none of it carries a public paper trail. That blind spot leaves the country open to adversarial exploitation of U.S. supply chains. Congress can close this gap by ensuring Sec. 6031 of the Senate manager’s package, which is based on the Manifest Modernization Act (S. 1259), is added to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2027 (S. 4784).

In an FDD Insight, FDD’s Elaine Dezenski and FDD Action’s Matt Zweig lay out why this provision could make a big difference:

• Existing ship manifest disclosure requirements are already producing results. Even the current, ocean-only regime has exposed front companies illegally supplying aircraft parts to sanctioned Russian airlines, surfaced Uyghur forced labor in U.S. supply chains, and helped investigators trace narcotics networks. Extending disclosure to air, truck, and rail would close the blind spots enforcers cannot currently see.
• The fix adds no new burdens or privacy risks. Access would follow the model that has governed ocean manifests for decades: verified subscription access, not an open public feed. The government would maintain existing confidentiality protections, screening sensitive information while leaving commercial identifiers visible enough to support enforcement.
• The timing fits a broader enforcement shift. Governments increasingly treat trade enforcement as a national security mission rather than a routine customs matter, investing in tools that flag high-risk goods before they reach U.S. supply chains. A transparency framework built around a single transportation mode is harder to justify. Closing the gap also shields compliant firms from competitors that cheat through forced labor, sanctions evasion, dumping, or counterfeits.

Located on the lower level of the Capitol Visitor Center, the Capitol Cafe offers breakfast and lunch menus. (Photo via Architect of the Capitol)

🍽️ Looking to try something new during the recess? We asked the FDD Action team for their favorite Washington restaurants.

• Carving Room NoMa: Whether brunch or dinner, the chef doesn’t disappoint. This spot earned a nationally televised stamp of approval from Guy Fieri on Diners, Drive-Ins and Dives. The Pastrami Poblano that caught the famous chef’s eye is worth the trip alone, though the bottomless brunch mimosas make a compelling case too.
• RUTA: The first and best Ukrainian restaurant in the DMV. This Capitol Hill spot is known for its borscht – a tangy beet-and-cabbage soup served with garlic-dill rolls – along with varenyky dumplings and chicken Kyiv. For dessert, try the honey cake, which won the 2024 People’s Choice Award at Washingtonian’s Best of Washington event.
• A. Litteri: Come for a great deli counter sandwich, but stay to browse the shop’s incredible selection of olive oil, wine, and pastas. This Union Market institution just turned 100, having opened in 1926 as a Sicilian immigrant’s corner grocery. Boasting a large supply of items imported from Italy, it’s a great spot before any Italian cooking adventure.
• Sichuan Pavilion: If you’re a Chinese food enthusiast, this restaurant is for you. The mapo tofu is “to die for,” and the Mongolian beef will leave you wanting seconds. And in case that wasn’t convincing enough, this spot is also a fan favorite of the Chinese Department at George Washington University.
• Parkway Deli: Located in Silver Spring, Maryland, this classic deli is known for its pickles, burgers, matzoh ball soup and Reuben sandwiches. Parkway Deli is a family business that opened in 1963 and is now in its third generation of operation. The menu runs pages deep, from chicken soup and a free pickle bar to a 13-pound carrot cake and homemade black-and-white cookies.
• Agora: Bring the whole crew to this one. This Turkish, Greek, and Lebanese mezze (small plates) spot in Dupont Circle is meant to be shared, with dishes passed around the table family-style. There are so many great options, but don’t miss the lamb chops and the saganaki cheese, which is flamed right at your table!