Policy Alert: Myths vs. Facts on the Sanctioning Russia Act of 2026

MYTH #1: The bill is a backdoor authority for the President to impose sweeping new tariffs.

FACT: The text of the bill contains language specifically forbidding this from happening.

• Rule of Construction: Section 113(h) states that notwithstanding the bill’s waiver provision, nothing in the Act may be construed to authorize duties on goods imported from any country not expressly covered by the bill. This rule of construction ensures that tariffs can only be applied to Russia and countries covered by the specific criteria in the bill.
• Clear Criteria: The bill text contains specific, limited criteria for covered countries that can be subject to Section 113 duties. Section 113(c) defines covered countries as countries that either 1) both made new purchases of Russian crude or gas 30 days or more after enactment and ranked among the five largest importers by volume over the preceding 12 months, or 2) ranked among the top five countries facilitating Russian oil sanctions evasion over the same period.
• Reduced Tariff Rate: The 2026 version of the Sanctioning Russia Act authorizes a tariff rate of up to 100 percent on covered countries. In comparison, the original 2025 bill included a minimum tariff rate on covered countries of 500 percent.
• Congressional Notification: Section 113(g)(1) requires the President or USTR to submit a written justification to the Finance, Foreign Relations, Banking, Ways and Means, Foreign Affairs, and Financial Services committees at least 10 days before imposing or adjusting any duty.

MYTH #2: This bill will harm our European allies.

FACT: The bill was drafted with specific provisions that take into account allied equities and harmonize U.S. and allied sanctions designations and other efforts.

• EU Not Tariffed: The covered countries under Section 113(c) are the largest buyers of Russian crude and gas by volume. While the EU as a whole would fall into that group, the tariffs only apply to individual countries. According to the bill’s sponsors, the top five purchasers of Russian crude are China, India, Slovakia, Hungary and Azerbaijan, and the top importers of Russian natural gas are China, France, Japan, Hungary and Belgium. Japan, France, Hungary and Belgium, however, would be carved out under a separate provision (see next bullet). USTR would re-evaluate the lists every 180 days.
• European Gas Carve Out: Section 113(d) carves out a country from gas-related duties if its Russian gas imports were under 15 percent of Russia’s total gas exports in the lookback period, and the country has taken significant steps to reduce them. That provision exists precisely for European states still finishing the work of weaning off Russian gas and creates a backstop against allied backsliding on those efforts.
• Limited Trade Impact: Even if Slovakia chooses to continue to buy enough Russian oil to be covered under the bill, the trade impact on U.S. imports would be limited. In 2025, the U.S. only imported $6.5 billion in goods from Slovakia.
• Harmonizing Sanctions: Section 102(c) allows the President to treat designation by the United Kingdom, the European Union, the G7, or a Five Eyes member as prima facie evidence that a vessel belongs to the shadow fleet. Section 102(b)(3)(C) does the same for the Price Cap Coalition.
• Exempting Non-Russian Crude: Section 114(g) exempts non-Russian oil that merely transits Russian territory, protecting Kazakh crude reaching European refiners. Section 114(i) provides a 270-day window for companies winding down or divesting Russian operations in good faith.

MYTH #3: American families will pay the brunt of the new tariffs.

FACT: The tariffs are designed to be avoided, not collected.

• Focus on Behavior, Not Revenue: Section 113 duties only apply to countries that make new purchases of Russian crude or gas 30 days or more after enactment, entirely conduct-based. A country that stops buying Russian oil or gas would not be covered. Section 113(b) further authorizes USTR to move the tariff rate down to any level above zero as a country reduces its purchases. The bill’s tariff tool is a conditional instrument calibrated to behavior, not a revenue-raising measure.
• Russia Tariffs: Direct exposure to Section 112, which raises duties on Russian-origin goods, is minimal because U.S. imports from Russia have already contracted to a small fraction of their prewar level.

MYTH #4: The sanctions are entirely discretionary, and the President will simply waive them.

FACT: The bill imposes mandatory sanctions, and any waivers issued require a signed document sent to Congress that makes specific certifications. This bill also locks into place existing sanctions that the administration previously could simply terminate at the stroke of a pen.

• Mandatory Sanctions: Sections 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, and 113 mandate that the President shall impose the specified measures. Section 103(a)(1)(B) names Sberbank, VTB Bank, and Gazprombank and requires the full slate of sanctions against them. Section 105 bars U.S. depository institutions and registered brokers from processing transfers to or from the Russian government at all.
• Waivers are not free: Section 115(b) requires a written national-interest certification to Congress plus a report explaining the basis for the waiver.
• Codifies Certain Russia Sanctions: Section 102(d) freezes the existing executive order architecture underpinning Russia sanctions in place, including every person already designated, so the current sanctions regime cannot be quietly unwound. Section 117 conditions termination of Russia-related measures on a certification that Russia has signed a peace agreement accepted by the free and independent Government of Ukraine and ceased all hostilities, followed by a congressional review period and a mechanism for an expedited joint resolution of disapproval.
• Preserves and Expands Sanctions: Compared to the status quo, in which Russia sanctions rest almost entirely on executive orders the President may revoke at will, this bill preserves and expands Russia sanctions in a way that does not currently exist.