USS Delbert D. Black (DDG 119) fires a Tomahawk Land Attack Missile in support of Operation Epic Fury, Feb. 28, 2026. (U.S. Navy photo)

1. In response to Iran’s surprise ballistic missile attack on U.S. military base in Jordan this week, the United States struck dozens of Iranian military targets, but there’s more policymakers can do to ramp up and maintain U.S. pressure on the regime in Iran.

• Tehran’s hit and miss: After some two weeks of nightly U.S. attacks on Iranian military targets, the President paused the renewed campaign last Friday to give diplomacy a chance. Iran had a different idea, instead attempting to catch U.S. forces off guard with its surprise attack on Tuesday. To the regime’s chagrin, all Iranian missiles were intercepted. Now, the United States has resumed its military pressure on the regime, striking dozens of military targets in response to degrade the threat Iran and its proxies pose to American forces, commercial shipping, and Gulf states.
• Breaking it down: “For the United States, these attacks are not the costs of war, rather the costs of unfinished business,” says FDD’s Behnam Ben Taleblu. To turn the tide, Washington must apply greater military force, because the current ‘no war, no peace’ situation is untenable, explains FDD’s Hussain Abdul-Hussain. Iranian strikes have had a devastating economic impact and left Gulf states with no doubt that the regime in Iran poses the most serious threat to their security. This forces the Gulf States to choose between appeasement, containment, and confrontation. The latter would mean stepping up their own defense or even acquiring nuclear weapons. “A better option is to resolve the problem now by urging Trump to follow through on his latest warnings to Iran’s rulers,” advises Abdul-Hussain.
• Treasury’s economic offensive: Washington has been tightening the economic screws, too. On Tuesday, Treasury unveiled a new round of sanctions against Iran’s shadow fleet network and sham maritime insurance (read: toll booth) scheme. These sanctions aim to reinforce economic pressure on Tehran and restore freedom of navigation. While this is a positive step, Treasury has yet to leverage the full economic toolkit at its disposal.
• Seal the deal: With the U.S.-Iran memorandum of understanding effectively a dead letter, Washington should formally end it to fully remove the sanctions waiver that enabled Tehran to repatriate oil revenue, explain FDD’s Max Meizlish and Janatan Sayeh. While key components have been revoked, this step would give Washington greater latitude to rebuild leverage by officially reimposing maximum pressure. Treasury should propose Section 311 action under the USA PATRIOT Act to designate international transfers involving Hong Kong or UAE shell companies tied to Iranian shadow banking as a class of transactions of primary money laundering concern, add Meizlish and Sayeh.
• Munitions shortage: To ensure U.S. forces have the means to maintain military pressure on the regime in Iran, policymakers must replenish America’s dwindling munitions stockpile, which has been depleted by years of insufficient defense budgets. “The United States must prioritize speed and scale, aiming for production and delivery of the largest quantity of low-cost munitions as quickly as possible,” explain FDD’s Brad Bowman and RADM (Ret.) Mark Montgomery. The Pentagon has begun doing so, reaching multi-year framework agreements with private industry to mass-produce tens of thousands of low-cost missiles. But all of this means nothing if Congress does not act.
• Fund the fight: Lawmakers must take action to rebuild America’s arsenal by appropriating the necessary funding without delay, urge Bowman and Montgomery. The most important policy challenge here is striking the right munitions-cost ratio that combines smaller quantities of sophisticated, expensive munitions with larger quantities of affordable ones. “It’s no exaggeration to say such a calculation will play a major role in determining how many of our fighters return home from the next war,” the pair warn.

The USS Chung-Hoon (DDG 93) in the Taiwan Strait alongside the Halifax-class frigate HMCS Montreal (FFG 336), Jun. 3, 2023. (U.S. Navy Photo by Petty Officer 1st Class Andre Richard)

2. Taiwan announced it will carry out new drills to prepare for a possible Chinese blockade and strengthen domestic communications resilience as China increases maritime pressure around the island nation. At the same time, Taipei is also bolstering its ability to outlast Chinese threats on the communications and energy security fronts.

• Preparing for siege and squeeze: Taiwan will integrate counter-blockade and quarantine drills into its annual defense exercises, which begin next week. This will couple resilience efforts with counter-invasion drills and allow Taipei to practice for the most likely scenario facing the island: a Chinese maritime blockade. By calling it a quarantine and more subtly interrupting Taiwan’s seaborne trade, Beijing can complicate U.S. decision-making. “This is the kind of coercion that flies under the threshold of war, but could still bring Taiwan to its knees,” explains FDD’s Craig Singleton.
• Beijing’s maritime aggression: The drills will follow two months of rising Chinese maritime coercion, during which the Chinese coast guard has increased patrols in Taiwan’s eastern waters. This marks a notable shift from China’s typical maritime concentration on the Taiwan Strait and the island’s western approaches, notes FDD’s Jack Burnham. However, the transition aligns with the Chinese military’s goal to be able to prevent Taiwan’s partners from reaching the island in a crisis. The increased presence, combined with possible mapping of undersea cables connecting Taiwan to Japan and the Philippines, aligns with Beijing’s efforts to divide the countries.
• Securing communications: Taiwan is simultaneously looking to strengthen its domestic communications resilience, passing a bill just last week to make it easier for foreign firms, like satellite internet providers, to enter its telecommunications sector. If fully implemented, the bill will help bolster resilience against Chinese intrusions into Taiwan’s communications networks, notes Burnham. The move follows a series of Chinese cable-cutting incidents targeting Taiwan’s outlying territories, as well as expansive Chinese cyberattacks against the island’s networks. “The United States and Taiwan should use their broader trade relationship and respective telecommunications sectors to enhance the island’s strategic resilience,” advises Burnham.
• Powering through coercion: These efforts are just a couple of the ways Taipei is preparing to hold off a Chinese blockade. The most important, however, is securing the island’s energy supply. An FDD tabletop exercise last May simulating a hypothetical Chinese energy quarantine of Taiwan showed the island running out of liquefied natural gas (LNG) within 11 days in a blockade. Singleton concluded, “Taiwan urgently needed to diversify both its energy suppliers and the means by which those supplies reach the island before a crisis.” Weaknesses in this area amplify Taiwan’s exposure to maritime coercion, supply-chain disruptions, and cyber intrusions.
• Cooperation enhances resilience: Washington should work with Taipei and other regional partners to practice escort and convoy operations, establish maritime corridors, and shield critical infrastructure from cyber intrusions, notes Burnham. To help, Congress should advance Sens. Pete Ricketts (R-NE) and Chris Coons’s (D-DE) Taiwan Energy Security and Anti-Embargo Act (S. 2722 / H.R. 7873). Introduced following the Senators’ participation in the FDD tabletop, this bipartisan legislation would harden Taiwan against energy coercion by directing the United States to prioritize LNG exports to Taiwan and deepening bilateral energy technology cooperation.

President Trump and Chairman of the Workers’ Party of Korea Kim Jong Un shake hands, June 30, 2019. (Official White House Photo by Shealah Craighead)

3. North Korea recently launched nuclear-capable missiles from a soon-to-be commissioned destroyer as it builds up its nuclear-armed navy.

• Rapid buildout: The missile launch came two weeks after Pyongyang commissioned its largest domestically produced surface warship, the Choe Hyon destroyer. Both developments are just the latest in a buildup of North Korea’s navy, which Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un declared has entered a “new era” after “over 70 years” of stagnation.
• A new level of lethality: The Choe Hyon marks a sharp break from North Korea’s past, obsolete naval vessels, fielding modern combat systems that make it a serious conventional and nuclear threat to U.S. forces and regional partners. If the buildup continues, it could erode allied naval dominance and complicate U.S. nuclear deterrence, explain FDD’s Logan Rolleigh and Ryan Brobst. That, in turn, could embolden the Kim regime to act more aggressively, raising the risk of conflict on the Korean Peninsula. The challenges will only deepen if Pyongyang clears its remaining hurdles: integrating modern technology into command-and-control suites, improving sailor training, expanding shipbuilding capacity, and adopting modern naval combat tactics.
• Response urgent: To counter the growing threat, Washington must deepen trilateral cooperation with Seoul and Tokyo through regular military exercises, while maintaining a robust force posture in South Korea, recommend Rolleigh and Brobst. At the same time, Congress should “require the Department of Defense to publish a previously congressionally mandated report – a requirement that expired in 2017 – on North Korean military capabilities that includes the regime’s growing security cooperation with Russia and China,” they add. Lawmakers should also mandate reports on whether U.S. military capabilities and war plans on the peninsula account for growing North Korean capabilities.

President Donald Trump meets with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy at the White House in Washington, D.C., Jul. 28, 2026. (@WhiteHouse via X)

1. President Trump met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy at the White House on Tuesday shortly before the Senate advanced a bill to impose harsher sanctions on Russia and the top countries fueling its war.

• Meeting in Washington: In town for the late Senator Lindsey Graham’s funeral, Zelenskyy asked Trump for an emergency package of 300 Patriot air defense interceptors by this winter to help thwart Russian attacks on Ukrainian energy infrastructure. Zelenskyy reported that Trump promised he would try to help but also made clear it is difficult because of the need for interceptors in the war with Iran. He also added that Trump envoys Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff will likely take their first visit to Ukraine in the next two weeks, allowing them to see the situation there firsthand and discuss ideas for relaunching peace talks.
• Oil funds Moscow’s war machine: Russia’s ability to fund its war machine depends heavily on continued energy export revenue, the backbone of Moscow’s federal budget. Despite the G7 price cap and other restrictions on Russian oil and gas sales, loopholes and evasion tactics have allowed significant revenue to continue flowing to Moscow and sustain its war on Ukraine. To bring Russia to the negotiating table and end the war, Washington must target its oil revenues and increase the pressure on the countries funding its war machine.
• How we can do it: Congress must enact the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026 (S. 5025), which would help hold Russia accountable for its invasion of Ukraine and bring the Kremlin to the negotiating table. The bill mandates sanctions against Russian government officials, financial institutions, and entities connected to Russia’s defense and energy sectors. It also prohibits U.S. investments and energy exports to Russia while giving the President authority to impose tariffs on the five largest importers of Russian crude oil or natural gas. The Senate voted 86–12 to advance this critical legislation earlier this week.
• Read More: We laid out the Myths vs. Facts of the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act on FDD Action’s website here.

Secretary of State Marco Rubio meets with Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Foreign Minister Faisal Bin Farhan in Manama, Bahrain, Jun. 25, 2026. (Official State Department Photo by Freddie Everett)

2. President Trump clarified certain terms and conditions of last week’s multi-billion-dollar U.S.-Saudi nuclear deal, casting doubts on its future. Nonetheless, serious questions remain for Congress to consider regarding the broader impact the deal could have on regional nonproliferation.

• Mixed signals on enrichment: The proposed U.S.-Saudi 123 agreement aims to give U.S. companies a central role in developing Saudi Arabia’s nuclear infrastructure while strengthening bilateral ties and keeping foreign adversaries out. When President Trump announced the deal was approved, he added it would be “totally subject” to Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords and that “there will be no enrichment of material!” This cast doubts on the deal’s plans to explore the construction of a U.S.-built, U.S.-controlled uranium enrichment plant in Saudi Arabia, if a joint U.S.-Saudi study determined it would be warranted. While this threw some cold water on the news, the deal is expected to be submitted to Congress for review, and there are serious concerns it must consider.
• Risks on two fronts: Beyond the back-and-forth, there are two main concerns Congress should consider. First, the United States will reportedly not require Saudi Arabia to adopt the Additional Protocol, an enhanced inspection arrangement. This would limit both inspectors’ access to any secret facilities, as well as their ability to detect weapons-related activities, warns FDD’s Andrea Stricker. Second, providing Riyadh with access to enrichment technology, even under strict controls, could trigger a regional arms race by spurring similar demands from countries like Turkey and Egypt or leading them to seek the technology elsewhere.
• Learn from Iran’s lesson: Washington should safeguard its successes in eliminating Iran’s enrichment capacity by preserving the “gold standard” of 123 agreements, which prohibits enrichment and reprocessing. Stricker explains, “President Trump should maintain longstanding U.S. policy against proliferating nuclear fuel-making capabilities by keeping enrichment technology away from Saudi soil.” Instead, Washington can offer nuclear technology and reactors to Riyadh while requiring that enrichment occur on U.S. soil, with fuel then shipped to the kingdom. Otherwise, Stricker warns this agreement not only complicates U.S. efforts to have Tehran forgo uranium enrichment and reprocessing, but it could also provoke the UAE to revisit its own 123 agreement. Congress’s role: Under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, the U.S.-Saudi 123 agreement must undergo a 90-day congressional review, during which lawmakers could attempt to block it via a joint resolution of disapproval. “If the accord advances, Congress should use its 90-day review to block it on nonproliferation grounds,” Stricker concludes.