Vice President JD Vance speaks at the Lake Lucerne Summit in Switzerland, Jun. 23, 2026. (Vice President JD Vance via X)

1. Vice President JD Vance announced this week that the Iranian regime agreed to admit nuclear inspectors. Yet as the Trump administration followed through on the MOU by giving Iran some sanctions relief, Tehran violated its commitments and attacked a cargo ship in the Strait of Hormuz.

• The inspection contention: Following the first round of high-level talks in Switzerland last weekend, Vance announced that the Islamic Republic of Iran agreed to invite International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors into the country as early as this week. While the regime rejected Vance’s assertion, President Trump jumped in on Truth Social, saying that Tehran did, in fact, agree to inspections. Even the head of the IAEA insisted the agency would return to Iran, according to the text of the U.S.-Iran memorandum of understanding (MOU) signed last week. The regime’s stonewalling of inspections it has already agreed to is “a delaying tactic to try to get benefits while not making concessions,” Institute for Science and International Security President David Albright explained on an FDD Action Secure Line call with Hill staffers Wednesday.
• A new inspections framework: For any Iran nuclear deal to be effective, the IAEA must have the means and access to verify Iranian compliance. For one, the regime must fully declare its past and present nuclear activities, as required under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), explained Albright. Not only would this aid inspectors’ investigative efforts, doing so would also indicate whether the regime is serious about a deal. It is also essential that inspectors be granted access to sites long denied to them, including military sites where nuclear weapons development has occurred. Lastly, Iran must be required to ratify the IAEA’s Additional Protocol and implement Modified Code 3.1, urges FDD’s Behnam Ben Taleblu. These measures would allow for snap inspections and require early notification of nuclear-related construction.
• MOU follow-through (and lack thereof): Even as Tehran violates its end of the MOU, the regime is receiving sanctions relief. On Thursday, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) attacked a Singapore-flagged cargo ship close to Oman’s coast in the Strait of Hormuz. Just a couple of days earlier, Treasury sent the regime a major financial gift, issuing a 60-day general license that authorizes the production, delivery, and sale of Iranian oil. Tehran is already testing the boundaries of the MOU and challenging the administration’s framing of sanctions relief as “performance based.”
• Sanctions relief needs guardrails: The general license Treasury issued on Monday is too vague, explains FDD’s Max Meizlish. It lacks an escrow mechanism, reporting requirements, an approved-buyer list, and other sale limitations. Such unrestricted relief will be a boon to the IRGC and Iranian armed forces, which are the beneficiaries of one third of Iran’s oil revenues. If Congress does not want the Iranian regime to become flush with cash, it must push for significant amendments to the license. The Treasury Department should also clarify whether the license is the first of many concessions and if it allows Tehran to repatriate proceeds from previously unauthorized oil sales, notes Meizlish.
• Congress’s say on nuclear concessions: Congress should also demand detailed notification of any contemplated sanctions relief, even implicitly tied to Iran’s nuclear program, in accordance with the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA). As Meizlish explains, there are several congressionally mandated sanctions that “cannot be permanently terminated” unless the President certifies that Iran has stopped supporting terrorism and verifiably dismantled its nuclear, biological, chemical, and ballistic missile programs.
• Key Questions for the Admin: The United States won important leverage against Tehran over the course of Operation Epic Fury, and that leverage must not be traded in lightly. “Congress has 60 days to conduct oversight and lay down guardrails for a potential final agreement,” warns FDD Action’s Alexandria Paolozzi Moore. In a new Policy Alert, FDD Action laid out urgent questions for the administration, including whether a deal will require permanent and verifiable nuclear dismantlement and if it will touch on the regime’s missile program and support for terrorism.

President Donald Trump bids farewell to President Xi Jinping of the People’s Republic of China at Zhongnanhai in Beijing, China. May 15, 2026. (Official White House Photo by Daniel Torok)

2. China added two U.S. critical minerals companies to its export-control blacklist on Monday. The move targets America’s rare earth comeback and demonstrates Beijing’s willingness to weaponize its dominance over critical mineral supply chains.

• China takes aim: Beijing’s decision to blacklist U.S. government-backed rare earth companies prohibits any entity anywhere from transferring Chinese-origin inputs to the firms. While both companies have moved away from direct Chinese supplies, China’s dominance over rare earth processing means the provision reaches deep into allied supply chains. What’s more, whether or not the prohibition can be enforced, the legal uncertainty it creates could chill investment in alternative suppliers.
• Beijing’s weapon of choice: In a statement this week, Beijing explained that the new restrictions are a response to the Pentagon’s decision to expand the list of Chinese military companies it will not do business with. FDD’s Craig Singleton says Beijing’s retaliation is “serious, expected, and calibrated.” It shows that China will meet U.S. technology and defense designations with targeted punishment, and that rare earth dependence remains among its most usable tools of economic coercion.
• Zooming out: China’s latest restrictions are not just a knee-jerk reaction but stand as the latest escalation in its increasingly onerous export control legal architecture. FDD’s Daniel Swift notes that Beijing began building that framework six years ago with the 2020 Export Control Law. Since then, China has layered dual-use designations, extraterritorial transfer prohibitions, and expanded licensing requirements into a unified enforcement framework. Each layer has widened Beijing’s discretion to reach new targets, sectors, and jurisdictions. Taken together, the moves reflect China’s maturing economic coercion strategy.
• Ambiguity as a weapon: If China moves forward with enforcing its extraterritorial controls against third-country suppliers, it could force countries like Australia, Brazil, and Malaysia to choose between Chinese suppliers and Washington. That prospect alone reshapes calculations. As Swift explains, third-country businesses weighing investments in U.S. rare earth supply chains “must now factor in the mere possibility of Chinese retaliation.”
• From pause to action: Washington should treat China’s export controls as economic warfare, not business as usual. Swift notes that the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) not only has the authority to finance allied rare earth mining and processing capacity, but has already deployed capital to do so. The DFC’s investments help reduce U.S. and allied vulnerability to Chinese economic warfare. However, DFC has suffered from staffing and funding disruptions, adds Swift. While Congress expanded DFC hiring authorities to attract industry expertise in 2025, it must also ensure the administration follows suit and staffs up, so the United States can be armed against Chinese interference.

Secretary of Commerce Howard Lutnick meeting with AMD Chair and CEO Dr. Lisa Su to discuss advancing American AI and technological leadership and dominance, Apr. 28, 2026. (U.S. Commerce Department via X)

1. The Commerce Department has held off on blacklisting over 100 companies flagged as national security risks while the Trump administration tries to avoid escalating tensions with Beijing.

• Chinese companies left off: The tranche of companies, which includes tech giants like AI startup DeepSeek, was reportedly approved by an interagency committee to be added to Commerce’s Entity List but has not seen further action. The report also noted that Commerce has not posted any additions to the Entity List since October, the longest stretch between new postings in over a decade. The list identifies foreign entities and individuals that are potentially engaged in activities contrary to U.S. national security. Designations cut off listed entities’ access to U.S. supply chains and technology, preventing advanced American technology from ending up in adversaries’ hands.
• Part of a long-term trend: While the exact reason for the hold-up is unclear, open-source reporting alone demonstrates how these companies support China’s military and act contrary to U.S. national security interests. Some of the Chinese companies pending designation have reportedly supplied Russian drones recovered in Poland, while others actively manufacture and sell drones and robot dogs to the Chinese military.
• Use available tools: The Entity List is only one piece of a broader toolkit, and Washington’s reluctance to use it weakens the broader export control framework. “The Entity List is a powerful economic tool that complements the Pentagon’s 1260H List and the FCC’s Covered List to safeguard cutting-edge American technologies and target China’s military industrial base,” says FDD’s Jack Burnham. “Washington should use all facets of its technology toolkit — procurement bans, export controls, and investment screening — to hinder Beijing’s military modernization efforts.”

NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte meets with Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, President of Türkiye, Apr. 23, 2026. (Official NATO Photo)

2. As American officials prepare for next month’s NATO summit in Turkey, the administration targeted several ISIS facilitators, including two based in Turkey. The designations reflect Ankara’s complicity in terrorist financing and activity.

• Cutting ISIS funding: On Monday, Treasury designated three individuals and six entities for facilitating financial transactions on behalf of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). This included two Turkey-based money service businesses within the financial network that ISIS relies on to stay connected with autonomous ISIS cells and affiliates. Among other things, the new sanctions expose foreign financial institutions to secondary sanctions if they knowingly facilitate transactions for those listed.
• Turkey’s terror ties: This is not a one-off. Turkey has served as a key transit hub for foreign fighters and enabled ISIS’s campaign to establish a caliphate. Ankara has also permitted senior Hamas terrorists to reside in its borders, including prisoners released in 2011 in exchange for an Israeli hostage. Just this week, Israel’s Shin Bet security agency announced that over the past year, it had foiled dozens of planned terror attacks in the West Bank directed by Hamas operatives based in Turkey.
• Give Ankara a push: The United States should compel Turkey to rein in its terror finance facilitators. Ankara lacks control over large swaths of its financial sector, allowing terrorist organizations to move money undetected. Until Turkey tightens its laws and regulations, Washington should work to return Turkey to the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) “grey list,” urge FDD’s Sinan Ciddi and William Doran. This designation would warn financial institutions of Turkey’s “improper anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing monitoring.”
• What can Congress do? Reps. Dan Goldman (D-NY) and Nicole Malliotakis (R-NY) introduced a bipartisan NDAA amendment to require a report on Turkey’s relationship with Hamas and its affiliates, including financial, political, and military assistance. Members should back this amendment to give Washington greater visibility into the extent of Turkish support for groups that threaten the United States.

The Department of Education’s building in Washington, D.C. (U.S. Department of State (IIP Bureau))

Pass the DETERRENT Act to protect higher education.

Weak disclosure rules around foreign money flowing into American universities create national security risks. The DETERRENT Act (H.R.1048 / S. 1296) would close this gap with targeted, commonsense transparency measures that strengthen existing law, ensuring colleges and universities disclose foreign funding that may pose such risks. The bill would lower the general reporting threshold of Sec. 117 of the Higher Education Act from single gifts worth $250,000 to $50,000 worth of combined gifts in a calendar year. It also sets a $0 threshold for countries of concern like China.

As Congress considers including the DETERRENT Act in the FY27 NDAA, FDD’s Craig Singleton explains why foreign funding disclosure is so critical:

• China is already inside. America’s higher education system underpins U.S. national security by educating experts, conducting research, and shaping future battlefield advantage. These strengths attract foreign governments seeking influence and access to sensitive research networks, with China at the center of that concern. Recent congressional investigations found that hundreds of millions of dollars in U.S. taxpayer-funded research contributed to China’s military and technological advancement, including collaboration in sensitive fields. Foreign governments also use gifts, contracts, and partnerships to gain footholds inside universities, revealing patterns of access and influence that should worry policymakers.
• Sharpen enforcement, improve risk assessment. Better disclosure would also improve implementation. Foreign funding data is most useful when cross-checked against existing risk indicators such as export-control restrictions, defense-related entity lists, and prior research-security concerns. This way, agencies can assess risk before grants are awarded, partnerships deepen, or universities grow dependent on opaque foreign funding.
• This isn’t a ban on foreign students. The transparency measures would not sacrifice one of America’s strategic advantages, its openness to global talent. Foreign students in higher education would remain free to pursue lawful study without nationality-based enrollment rules, while legitimate academic exchange is not impeded. The focus is disclosure: foreign gifts, contracts, partnerships, counterparties, and the terms attached to them.