April 9, 2026 | Secure Line Readout
What Comes Next in Iran? Ceasefire, Operation Epic Fury, and the Road Ahead
April 9, 2026 Secure Line Readout
What Comes Next in Iran? Ceasefire, Operation Epic Fury, and the Road Ahead
On FDD Action’s latest Secure Line briefing call, experts Behnam Ben Taleblu and Bradley Bowman assessed the Iran conflict following President Trump’s April 7 ceasefire announcement. Ben Taleblu warned that Iran is leveraging both military and economic threats in the Strait of Hormuz to force countries into bilateral “pay to play” dealings. Bowman walked through the Pentagon’s battle damage assessment — more than 13,000 targets struck — but cautioned that Chairman Caine’s own language shows the mission is not yet complete: 20% of Iran’s nuclear industrial base was not even hit, and half of the IRGC’s small attack boats survive. Both briefers argued that Congress has an opportunity to articulate what a good deal looks like — opening the Strait, no sunset clauses, no enrichment, not taking terrorism off the negotiating agenda — and warned that key U.S. air defense interceptors are at dangerously low levels heading into what may be only a temporary pause.
The Strait is not open: Iran dropped roughly 10–12 mines and is directing traffic through Iranian territorial waters, forcing coordination with the IRGC or IRI Navy. But the regime’s real leverage comes from amplifying market anxiety on top of these military threats, forcing countries to deal bilaterally with Tehran — a “pay to play” strategy designed to fracture collective resolve and replace the international consensus that the Strait is a shared waterway.
Major military progress, but not mission accomplished: U.S. forces struck 13,000+ targets including 450+ ballistic missile storage facilities, 800 drone storage sites, 1,500 air defense targets, and 150 ships. But Gen. Caine’s own language matters: 80% of air defenses were “destroyed,” but 90% of weapons factories were merely “attacked” — and 20% of Iran’s nuclear industrial base was not even hit.
The ceasefire is a race: Both sides are sprinting to reposition, replenish, and reconstitute. Iran will seek to rebuild air defenses and replenish ballistic missiles, with Chinese sodium perchlorate shipments and dual-use support enabling that effort. The U.S. must win this race, particularly given dangerously low interceptor stocks.
The Iranian people are watching — and waiting: After 41 days of national internet shutdown, the Iranian population — the most pro-American in the Middle East — fears the U.S. pulling back midway and cutting a deal that allows the regime to turn its guns inward again, as it did in January. Restoring internet access is the top non-kinetic priority.
Shaping a potential deal: Congress has an opportunity to articulate what a good deal looks like: opening the Strait, no sunset clauses, no enrichment, comprehensive inspections including military sites, and not taking terrorism off the negotiating agenda. The Obama-era JCPOA negotiations took years and addressed only the nuclear file — this agenda is far more ambitious.
The Strait of Hormuz: Market Panic as a Weapon
Ben Taleblu opened the call with a detailed assessment of the situation in the Strait of Hormuz. He emphasized that the Islamic Republic does not physically control the Strait — an international waterway through which one-fifth of seaborne traded oil passes daily, along with food, fertilizer, and other commodities. What Iran has done is drop roughly 10 to 12 mines and begun directing maritime traffic through Iranian territorial waters, forcing coordination with either the IRGC Navy (a designated terrorist organization) or the regular Iranian Navy under threat of attack.
The real amplifier, Ben Taleblu argued, is not military capability but markets. The more collective public panic there is, the more it produces a contagion effect in energy markets that cools U.S. resolve. Iran’s strategy is to force every country with an economic interest in the Strait to deal bilaterally with Tehran — a “pay to play” scheme designed to replace the international consensus that the Strait is a shared waterway with a new reality in which Iran controls access.
The regime has been incrementally adjusting the number of tankers it allows through: roughly 6 per day at the height of conflict, about 10 previously, and reportedly 15 during the ceasefire period. Ben Taleblu urged staffers to track this number closely and to push back on the framing, noting that if the regime claims to be a good-faith actor, it should provide assurances of no attacks during negotiations and allow allied nations with mine-sweeping capabilities — such as Japan or France — to clear the limited mines. If Iran objects to that, the ceasefire framework is a house of cards.
“The more we have a collective public freakout about it, the more there’s a contagion effect in markets, the more that has a cooling effect on US will to stay in the fight.”
— Behnam Ben Taleblu, on Iran’s Strait of Hormuz strategyBattle Damage Assessment: The Numbers and What They Mean
Bowman walked through the Pentagon’s April 8 press conference in detail, starting with the three military objectives Gen. Caine said the president ordered: destroy Iran’s ballistic missile and drone capabilities, destroy the Iranian Navy, and destroy their defense industrial base to ensure Iran cannot reconstitute the ability to project power outside its borders. Bowman pointed out that this is an incredibly robust set of military objectives.
The headline numbers from Gen. Caine:
- More than 13,000 targets struck, including 4,000 dynamic (mobile or pop-up) targets
- 1,500+ air defense targets
- 450+ ballistic missile storage facilities
- 800 one-way attack drone storage facilities
- 2,000+ command and control nodes
- 150 ships sunk (half the IRGC Navy’s small attack boats)
- 700+ naval mine targets
But Bowman urged staffers to pay close attention to the language used alongside the percentages. In Pentagon terminology, “destroyed” is not the same as “degraded,” and “attacked” is not the same as “destroyed.” He broke down the chairman’s own metrics: approximately 80% of Iran’s air defense systems were destroyed (meaning 20% survived); more than 90% of the regular fleet was sunk and half of the IRGC small attack boats (meaning those boats can still lay mines and attack commercial vessels); more than 95% of naval mines destroyed; approximately 90% of weapons factories were “attacked” (not destroyed); more than 80% of missile facilities are “gone”; and nearly 80% of Iran’s nuclear industrial base was “hit” — meaning 20% was not even hit, and of those that were, “hit” is not “damaged” or “severely degraded.”
“Destroyed is not the same thing as degraded, whether you’re talking about an individual system or a whole capability. These words are being mixed by people who are commenting.”
— Bradley Bowman, on reading the Pentagon’s battle damage assessmentDeep Dives
Ben Taleblu assessed the state of regime leadership after 38 days of strikes, including the killing of former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in the opening minutes of the operation. Iran has moved to his son, Mojtaba Khamenei, who allegedly still sits at the apex of the political system, but the IRGC has emerged as the most important institution — a trend predating the war but accelerated by it.
The most important political body, he argued, is the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), whose secretary and agenda-setting secretariat draw from military, civilian, and religious establishments but have an overrepresentation of military voices. The current secretary is IRGC veteran Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr, as were his two predecessors. National security figures and military officials have been targeted in decapitation strikes, but political leaders have largely not been on the targeting agenda by either the United States or Israel.
The key figure to watch for negotiations is parliament speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf — a former IRGC member, former mayor of Tehran, former police chief, and former major IRGC contractor who, Ben Taleblu noted, is eligible for at least four or five different U.S. sanctions under executive orders spanning the Bush, Obama, Trump, and Biden administrations but has never been sanctioned. He is allegedly going to be negotiating directly or indirectly via the Pakistanis with the United States.
The fundamental problem, Ben Taleblu warned, is that after six weeks of war and decapitation strikes, no one can be certain whether the remaining leadership can deliver on any agreement. The personal ties that bind this system — not formal chains of command — are what determine real authority. Whoever negotiates will be “rolling the dice” on whether these figures can actually enforce commitments.
Bowman framed the ceasefire as a competitive sprint, drawing on the precedent of the post-12-Day War period. The U.S. and Israel are in a race against Iran to see who can reposition, replenish, re-arm, reconstitute, and repair more effectively. Iran will be eager to rebuild air defenses and replenish ballistic missile stocks — and it is getting help. Bowman flagged Chinese sodium perchlorate shipments (a chemical precursor for solid-fuel missile propellant) and reports of Chinese dual-use technology support.
The administration is maintaining extraordinary levels of American combat power in the region, “casting the shadow of power over the negotiating table,” as Bowman put it, borrowing the late George Shultz’s phrase. But he noted there are opportunity costs — the USS Ford’s extended deployment being one example — and that the Pentagon, CENTCOM, and each service branch are actively weighing the tradeoffs.
A critical data point: according to Gen. Caine, the U.S. intercepted more than 1,700 missiles and drones during the conflict. Iran’s ballistic missile launches have escalated across recent conflicts: 120 in April 2024, 200 in October 2024, approximately 525 in the 12-Day War, and roughly the same number in this war. Bowman highlighted that the U.S. fired one quarter of its THAAD interceptors during the 12-Day War alone, and key interceptor stocks are now at “dangerously low levels.” The administration’s Arsenal Freedom initiative aims to increase production capacity, but that will take time — and Congress has a critical authorizing and appropriating role.
Ben Taleblu assessed conditions inside Iran. As of the call, the national internet shutdown had lasted 41 days. He argued this tells you how weak the regime is — it wants only its own voices, surrogate voices, and proxy voices shaping public opinion.
He stressed that this population — the most pro-American in the Middle East — is giving a “pale green light” to continued operations. The population’s greatest fear is the U.S. pulling back midway through, cutting a deal that allows the regime to turn its guns inward again as it did during the January massacre of tens of thousands.
Ben Taleblu’s top non-kinetic priority: restoring internet access. He questioned why, after six weeks of targeting, the infrastructure that allows the regime to maintain its internet shutdown and keep its national intranet operational was not itself a military target — and urged staffers to raise that question with the administration.
- Iran Human Rights, Internet Freedom, and Accountability Act (H.R. 7622) — Would condemn the regime’s crackdown on peaceful protests, call for the release of political prisoners, and expand funding for internet freedom programs.
- Internet Reach and Access Now (IRAN) Act (H.R. 7380) — This bipartisan bill would fund technologies that support internet freedom in Iran like VPNs and direct-to-cell technologies and increase public access to them.
Bowman dedicated significant time to the roles of China and Russia. He stated that Russia is reportedly providing targeting information to Iran to kill U.S. troops, and urged staffers to consider what costs are being imposed for that. He connected this directly to the sanctions debate: lifting sanctions on Russia gives them more resources for the war in Ukraine and for helping Iran target American forces.
Additional Russian enablement flagged: helping Iran put satellites in space likely used for ISR and targeting; providing intelligence through Iran to the Houthis for targeting maritime shipping in the Red Sea; working with Iran and the Assad regime to target U.S. troops in Syria; and a December agreement (reported in February by Reuters and the Financial Times) for Russia to sell Iran man-portable air defense systems to shoot down aircraft.
On China: sodium perchlorate shipments to Iran for solid-fuel missile propellant, and broader dual-use support to Iran, North Korea, and Russia.
Bowman drew directly on his experience as a Senate staffer during the Obama-era Iran negotiations. He identified several specific red lines that Congress should watch for in any emerging deal:
Sunset clauses: If Iran truly believes its commitments on centrifuges and nuclear programs, why would it need sunset clauses? Either commitments are permanent or they are not. Any word of sunset clauses should trigger intense congressional scrutiny.
Inspection regimes: Any deal must include access to military sites. Bowman noted that the JCPOA did not allow inspections of military bases and called that “laughable.” The standard should be “don’t trust and verify” — inspections must be comprehensive enough to detect cheating.
Enrichment: Any deal that includes continued enrichment is, in Bowman’s words, “ridiculous.” He also flagged the plutonium pathway to a bomb as something that must not be overlooked.
Terrorism: The Obama deal took terrorism off the table entirely. Given October 7th, Hezbollah, and the Houthis, the role of Iran as terror patron cannot be excluded from negotiations.
Ballistic missiles and ICBMs: Don’t think of missiles only as conventional weapons. The U.S. intelligence community has assessed for over a decade that ICBMs would be the means by which Iran delivers a nuclear weapon. Iran is progressing toward ICBM capability via space-launch vehicle programs, with some Russian assistance.
Ben Taleblu added a framework for evaluating any Iranian concession. He pointed staffers to FDD’s March 2025 dismantlement monograph — a detailed framework across six categories and 19 sections covering nuclear, missile, and other dimensions. The critical question: Are we paying for something we already took away on the battlefield for free? Are we being asked to give sanctions relief for concessions that military force already achieved? Or is this something genuinely new?
“No deal is better than a bad deal with this regime.”
— Bradley Bowman, on the standard Congress should apply to any Iran agreementOversight — Sanctions on Key Negotiators: Why has parliament speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf — who is eligible for sanctions under at least four or five executive orders spanning the Bush, Obama, Trump, and Biden administrations — not been subject to a single U.S. sanction? Letters to Treasury, State, and the administration are warranted.
Oversight — Internet Shutdown Infrastructure: After six weeks of strikes on Iranian military infrastructure, why was the infrastructure enabling the regime’s 41-day national internet shutdown not targeted? This question should be directed to military and intelligence officials.
Oversight — China and Russia Enablement: What diplomatic and economic costs are being imposed on Russia for reportedly providing targeting information to Iran to kill U.S. troops? What is being done about Chinese sodium perchlorate shipments and dual-use technology transfers to Iran?
Appropriations — Interceptor Stocks and Arsenal Production: Key air defense interceptors are at dangerously low levels after intercepting 1,700+ missiles and drones. One quarter of THAAD interceptors were expended during the 12-Day War alone. Congress must examine whether the Arsenal Freedom initiative’s production timelines are sufficient and whether supplemental appropriations are needed.
Legislation — Internet Freedom: Advance the Iran Human Rights, Internet Freedom, and Accountability Act (H.R. 7622) and the Internet Reach and Access Now (IRAN) Act (H.R. 7380). Contact FDD Action for details on these bills.
Negotiations — Deal Standards: Congress should establish clear public markers now: no sunset clauses, no enrichment, comprehensive inspections including military sites, terrorism addressed, no Iranian control of the Strait, and the ballistic missile/ICBM program fully on the table.