May 28, 2026 | Policy Alerts

Policy Alert: Key Questions as U.S.-Iran Negotiations Progress

May 28, 2026 | Policy Alerts

Policy Alert: Key Questions as U.S.-Iran Negotiations Progress

Bottom Line Up Front

The U.S.-Iran memorandum of understanding (MOU) under negotiation raises important strategic questions. The framework described would pause the conflict for 60 days, lift the blockade, and reopen the Strait of Hormuz. It would also provide for further negotiations over the removal of Iran’s highly enriched uranium stockpile and a moratorium on further enrichment.

Congress must look beyond the noise and define what a durable agreement requires. As negotiations progress, this policy alert identifies questions that policymakers on the Hill should ask.

FDD Action Expert Analysis

“The United States entered this negotiation with overwhelming leverage against Tehran. The regime is in financial freefall, its nuclear program is heavily damaged, and the U.S. naval blockade has choked off its primary source of revenue. With reporting on the prospective framework being debated and contradicted in real time, it is critical that Members of Congress outline what a good deal would look like and ask the administration serious questions. For one, any lasting deal would require the means to enforce compliance from a regime with a long and documented record of violations.”

Alexandria Paolozzi Moore

– Alexandria Paolozzi Moore, Senior Director of Government Relations, FDD Action

The Reported Framework

  • Deal details, as reported: Press coverage over the weekend from multiple outlets indicated that an emerging framework agreement is nearing conclusion. The initial reporting described a memorandum of understanding that would last 60 days and could be extended by mutual consent. The framework would pause the conflict that began on February 28, reopen the Strait of Hormuz, and lift the U.S. naval blockade of Iranian ports. It would also provide for further negotiations regarding the removal of Iran’s highly enriched uranium stockpile and a time-bound suspension of Iran’s uranium enrichment program.
  • Up in the air: While reports from over the weekend claimed the regime would receive gradual U.S. sanctions relief and see a phased release of frozen Iranian assets, the President has since rejected these claims. It is unclear whether it addresses Iran’s ballistic missile program and proxy financing.

National Security Concerns and Questions Congress Should Raise

1. Any “sunsetting” of nuclear restrictions rebuilds the 2015 Iran deal’s original flaw and undermines long-standing U.S. opposition to Iran’s nuclear program.

  • The Concern: Although nuclear issues are still being negotiated, a key piece of the draft MOU is the regime in Iran reportedly committing to suspend enrichment and surrender its nuclear material. However, other contested reports from earlier this month described the enrichment moratorium as lasting 12–15 years, after which Tehran could resume enrichment up to 3.67%. That could mean no permanent prohibition on enrichment or reprocessing.
  • The Implications: If the nuclear component of the MOU has an expiration date, it will reproduce a central defect of the original Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) — that the regime need not cheat to become a threshold nuclear state, it only has to wait. The United States could also be seen as weakening its stance against Iran’s long-asserted “right to enrich,” because the 2025 snapback of UN sanctions already required Iran to suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities. Tehran seeks these time-based restrictions precisely because they allow it to maintain a patient pathway to nuclear weapons.

Questions for the Administration

What permanent and verifiable prohibitions on nuclear enrichment, reprocessing, and weaponization-related work does the MOU contain, or is the administration requesting the MOU contain? Will the United States require physical removal of the highly enriched uranium stockpile, verified by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), before conceding on sanctions, the blockade, or other U.S. leverage points? Will the administration submit any nuclear agreement to Congress as required by the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act, and what form will the final agreement take?

2. Without securing the dismantlement of Iran’s nuclear program, Iran can resume nuclear activities at any time.

  • The Concern: A critical flaw of the JCPOA was that Iran retained its uranium enrichment facilities, and therefore, the capacity to rapidly resume enrichment at a time of its choosing. What remains to be negotiated is the details of a permanent and verifiable dismantlement of Iran’s nuclear weapons program, as the President, senior administration officials, and Congress have insisted and as Sec. 401(a) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act (CISADA) requires in law.
  • The Implications: No matter how long Tehran commits to halt enrichment activities, any nuclear agreement that does not require Iran “to fully declare and verifiably dismantle all enrichment, reprocessing, and weaponization capabilities, facilities, and assets” will not stand the test of time. Without dismantlement, Tehran’s commitments are simply rhetorical. The regime would maintain the ability to resume enrichment at a time of its choosing, as it did under the JCPOA, and it would be likely to cheat. Furthermore, it would be well-positioned to exit a deal as soon as the President’s term ends, rendering even a long-term moratorium temporary. No dismantlement means the deal expires when Trump leaves office.

Questions for the Administration

Will a complete, verifiable dismantlement of Iran’s nuclear facilities and nuclear weapons program be part of an agreement? If not, how can the United States be sure that the Islamic Republic of Iran will not retain capabilities and ensure the regime does not resume nuclear activities covertly or before the term of the moratorium sunsets? Moreover, will the administration ask Iran for a full accounting of all past nuclear activity to aid in verification efforts?

3. Comprehensive sanctions relief would recapitalize a regime in financial freefall as the sanctions architecture itself is about to sunset.

  • The Concern: Early reports indicated that the MOU would see the United States gradually lift sanctions and release frozen Iranian funds. While the President rejected these claims, saying discussions do not include “easing of sanctions or giving money,” the United States could lose an essential tool if Congress fails to renew expiring statutory sanctions.
  • The Implications: Releasing funds into an economic environment controlled top-down by a regime that sponsors terrorism, sells weapons to our adversaries, and massacres its own people would have dangerous implications. The world witnessed the consequences of policies like these when Hamas, an Iran-backed terrorist organization, massacred civilians on October 7, 2023. Rather than reaching the Iranian people, these funds will likely fuel the regime’s malign activities across the Middle East. Any inflow of cash to the regime would be compounded by the December 31 expiration of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996, which has been the statutory backbone of U.S. sanctions on Iran’s energy sector for three decades. If Congress does not strike that sunset, Washington would lose an essential piece of leverage over the regime. The result is double disarmament: cash flowing in and statutory sanctions flowing out.

Questions for the Administration

What sanctions relief, whether explicit or implicit, has the administration offered the Islamic Republic of Iran? If sanctions relief is included in the deal, how would it be sequenced, and how would the administration be able to ensure it is not allowing the regime to rebuild its proxy network and weapons programs? Does the administration support congressional efforts to either extend or permanently authorize the Iran Sanctions Act?

4. Excluding Iran’s ballistic missile program and terror financing from a deal would ignore a key component of the regime’s threat axis.

  • The Concern: Any final agreement must address Iran’s ballistic missile program and extensive proxy network.
  • The Implications: A nuclear-only agreement that leaves the regime’s missile arsenal and terrorist financing intact would undermine U.S. efforts to contain the imminent Iranian threat. If not addressed, Iran would retain its primary instruments of regional coercion. This repeats another structural error of the JCPOA, which left the regional aggression question unanswered.

Questions for the Administration

How will the MOU address Iran’s ballistic missiles and drone program, which arms our adversaries and Iran’s terror networks? Will the agreement address the regime’s financial support for its terror networks?

5. No deal can be viable if it lacks mechanisms for enforcement.

  • The Concern: In the event that a final deal is reached and U.S. forces end their operations against Iran, Washington may lack a mechanism to ensure the regime holds up its end of the agreement, whether it is on the nuclear front or in the strait.
  • The Implications: Without a strong U.S. military presence in the region, the United States could be unable to deter and respond to Iranian tactics, including the laying of additional mines or drone and missile strikes against commercial and civilian targets. Similarly, Tehran could resume nuclear activities to test Washington’s willingness to enforce redlines.

Questions for the Administration

If Iran uses its drone or missile arsenal to strike commercial vessels or other regional targets, will that automatically nullify the terms of the agreement, or will there be a mechanism to determine violations? What additional resources and international partnerships will be required to ensure the deal is enforced?

6. Strait of Hormuz: Any U.S. acquiescence to Iranian control over the strait would fatally undermine America’s commitment to freedom of navigation.

  • The Concern: The reported MOU would see Tehran lift its restrictions on the Strait of Hormuz (not imposing tolls and agreeing to clear the mines it deployed) in exchange for Washington lifting its naval blockade of Iranian ports and issuing some sanctions waivers for Iran to sell oil. It is essential that Iran’s surrender of its claims to the strait makes it into the final text.
  • The Implications: The Strait of Hormuz is an international waterway, making freedom of navigation through it immutable, even in time of conflict. The United States has spent centuries steadfastly defending the principle that no state may condition passage through international waters — a principle reaffirmed by the UN Security Council with respect to the strait in March. At yesterday’s Cabinet meeting, President Trump stated that the strait “will be open to everybody” and that it is “international waters.” Secretary of State Marco Rubio also rejected any tolling arrangement, stating, “It can’t happen.” Any U.S. endorsement, tacit or otherwise, of Iran conditioning or monetizing transit would surrender the legal architecture underwriting global maritime commerce.

Questions for the Administration

Will the administration commit that any agreement contains no provision, whether explicit or implicit, recognizing Iran or any other government’s authority to charge tolls, allocate access, impose fees, require permits, or otherwise condition transit through the Strait of Hormuz? Now that the Treasury Department has sanctioned the Persian Gulf Strait Authority, will the administration continue to block mechanisms that would provide Iran direct access to foreign currencies and normalize transactions with Iranian financial institutions through a toll or fee system?

Additional Resources

Issues:

Iran Sanctions and Illicit Finance