President Trump updates members of the media on the rescue of missing U.S. airmen in Iran, Apr. 6, 2026. (Official White House Photo by Daniel Torok)

1. The United States reportedly struck Iran’s Qeshm Island on Monday as Washington weighs another round of large-scale strikes. But Washington should hold off on a broader campaign and keep choking off Tehran’s oil revenue and other economic lifelines instead.

• Recent strikes: Monday’s strike is the latest in a series of reportedly limited U.S. defensive strikes kept quiet to avoid signaling a return to major combat, The Wall Street Journal reported. The report noted the United States has moved additional missile defenses and munitions into the region and told Gulf nations to prepare for a short but intense post-election operation. These developments may indicate a new round of broader operations against Iran. Asked Monday whether he was considering strikes after the elections, President Trump said no, but on Tuesday, he declined to rule them out.
• Focus on what works: Another round of large-scale U.S. strikes could throw the regime a lifeline by giving it an excuse for worsening conditions at home, warns FDD’s Miad Maleki. Before Operation Epic Fury was launched on February 28, the collapsing rial sparked major protests, which the regime answered with the deadliest crackdown in its history. The war then enabled the regime to continue its crackdown, Maleki explains. However, with large-scale strikes paused, the regime is left to face the pain of the U.S. blockade and sanctions on its own, and Washington should keep it that way.
• Don’t give Tehran an out: America’s economic pressure is working, Maleki outlines. Iran exported roughly 1.8 million barrels of crude a day before the war, but independent commodities data from mid-October indicates that Tehran is now unable to export any oil. The rial hit a record low against the dollar on October 4, and consumer prices in September were reportedly up 89.8% from a year earlier. On October 16, U.S. CENTCOM Commander Adm. Brad Cooper said Tehran was “withholding salaries, pensions and benefits” from Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps personnel and workers in several sectors, including oil and manufacturing. Washington should double down on what is working, Maleki urges, by maintaining the blockade and sanctions and rejecting any deal that restores Tehran’s oil income.
• Target the repressors: Washington should tell Iranians that the United States will stand with them when they return to the streets and help them stay online with satellite internet terminals, explains Maleki. If Washington uses force again, it should target the regime’s instruments of repression, Maleki urges, including the Basij militia and the state broadcaster that airs forced confessions. Pressure from Iranians themselves could push the regime to accept U.S. demands for an end to uranium enrichment, the removal of its highly enriched uranium, and limits on missiles, Maleki adds.

NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte meets with Donald Tusk, Prime Minister of Poland (NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization, CC BY-NC-ND 2.0)

2. A Polish constitutional crisis erupted last week after judges backed by PM Donald Tusk’s government moved to oust the constitutional court’s head over the objections of President Karol Nawrocki, creating a standoff that the United States should help resolve.

• How it happened: The Polish parliament elected judges to the Constitutional Tribunal between May and September 2026. Polish law requires newly elected judges to take an oath before the President before assuming their duties. After President Nawrocki declined to receive their oaths, four took them without him present. Tusk’s government recognized their oaths while Nawrocki disputed their legitimacy. The Tusk government-backed judges then claimed a Tribunal majority, and on October 30 suspended the Tribunal’s president and deputy, as police denied the two access to the Tribunal’s premises. Protestors rallied outside of the court calling Tusk’s actions a judicial coup while Nawrocki denounced the moves as illegally taking over the Tribunal.
• Putting it in context: Poland is unique in that both its PM and President hold significant power. “If these forces ever exerted their full authority against each other, they could in theory create this perpetual and eternal political standoff. That is what we’re seeing right now,” FDD’s Peter Doran explains. He then puts it in an American context: it would be as if the Justice Department told the Supreme Court justices they were being replaced by new judges, which to Americans would “look like an attack on the rule of law.”
• Lawful alternatives exist: Defending his actions, Tusk argued he has a duty to restore the rule of law after years of lawlessness under the previous government. “This is a difficult process, sometimes painful, and it requires decisive action,” Tusk wrote on social media. Yet lawful alternatives exist, explains Doran. Members of Tusk’s coalition have proposed a constitutional amendment to “reset” the court, although other coalition figures resist working on it. Alternatively, former PM Mateusz Morawiecki has called for a no-confidence vote to replace Tusk’s coalition with a caretaker government until national elections next year. While these two paths are in opposition to each other, “both would be lawful and settle the dispute through democratic processes,” Doran adds.
• An opening for Russia: On November 3, Tusk accused Russia of seeking to fuel “instability” in Poland after Dmitry Medvedev, the deputy chairman of Russia’s Security Council, described the Tusk government’s actions as “a coup.” The Polish government and the main opposition party both support Ukraine, FDD Action’s Daniel Vaynshteyn tells us. But “Russia could be using this political crisis as an opportunity to sow instability and increase political division inside a country at the forefront of deterring Kremlin aggression.”
• Calling Washington: So far, U.S. Ambassador Tom Rose has urged calm while saying Washington has no role in judging or intervening in Poland’s internal affairs. But “without U.S. diplomatic intervention to broker a compromise, the dispute will undercut the Trump administration’s aim to present Poland as a model American ally for others to follow,” warns Doran. He recommends Secretary of State Marco Rubio publicly call for a mutual standstill. This would include ending the Tribunal president’s suspension, withdrawing the police cordon around the Tribunal building, and temporarily freezing rulings by the disputed judges. The White House should also appoint a senior envoy acceptable to both camps to convene Tusk, Nawrocki, and leaders of the party that backs Nawrocki around the “lawful routes available to them,” Doran adds.

President Trump meets with Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahu, Jul. 28, 2026. (Official White House Photo by Daniel Torok)

1. President Trump has said Washington will cut the $3.8 billion in annual security assistance to Israel, a premature end to the current memorandum of understanding.

• Ending the deal: On November 3, President Trump said that he would end U.S. military aid to Israel by year-end, explaining that “they no longer need it.” This would prematurely end the FY 2019-2028 memorandum of understanding (MOU), under which the United States provides Israel with $3.8 billion annually for Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and joint missile and rocket defense programs. However, Congress funds the aid each year, and Trump did not say how he would end it. It is also worth noting that most of the FMF spending goes to American defense manufacturers, which supports the U.S. economy. Ending U.S. military assistance before Israel can recalibrate would also leave Israel’s military vulnerable, which hurts Washington, too.
• Mutually beneficial: The FMF is a multiplier that benefits both the U.S. and Israel. FMF increases surge capacity and helps sustain production lines that supply both countries, while the MOU’s predictability lets Israel plan multiyear acquisitions, explain FDD’s Justin Leopold-Cohen and Samuel Ben-Ur. FMF-financed Israeli fighters degraded Iranian air defenses before American bombers struck Iran’s nuclear program, reducing America’s military burden and potentially saving American lives. But Trump’s abrupt timing is especially dangerous for Israel, warn Leopold-Cohen and Ben-Ur. Jerusalem plans to spend over $20 billion of anticipated FMF over a decade beginning in FY 2029. “Removing anticipated support could complicate Israeli procurement and defer essential capabilities or divert funds from other defense needs, threatening future readiness,” they add.
• Maximize joint development: The administration should work with Congress to complete the remainder of the current MOU, with the goal of finalizing a subsequent 10-year minimum MOU before FY 2029, urge Leopold-Cohen and Ben-Ur. That next MOU should reduce FMF only when the security situation allows and should expand cooperation on counter-drone systems and directed-energy defenses.

U.S. Special Envoy Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin in the Red Drawing Room at the Kremlin in Moscow, Russia, Sept. 5, 2026. (Official White House Photo by Daniel Torok)

2. The Trump administration is considering lifting sanctions on a Russian government slush fund in a move that highlights the need for congressional oversight.

• Relief on the table: The reported rationale for lifting sanctions on the Russia Direct Investment Fund (RDIF), which Treasury labeled a “slush fund” for Vladimir Putin in 2022, is to “improve U.S.-Russia relations and help end the war.” This follows President Trump’s broad waivers of sanctions and tariffs under the recently enacted Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act (P.L. 119-111).
• What’s at risk? Sanctions relief would likely bolster Russia’s war effort as Moscow faces mounting financial pressure, note FDD’s Max Meizlish and Angela Howard. It would also replenish Putin’s patronage network. “This would relieve pressure on a key constituency whose incentives might otherwise involve pushing for peace,” the pair warn.
• Add guardrails: Sanctions relief should be “earned through verifiable Russian concessions, not offered in anticipation of them,” Meizlish and Howard write. The Trump administration should keep sanctions on RDIF and reverse its sweeping sanctions and tariff waivers. As for Congress, it should amend the Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act to impose time limits on such waivers.

President Trump greets President of South Africa Cyril Ramaphosa, May 21, 2025. (Official White House Photo by Daniel Torok)

3. The Trump administration intends to terminate South Africa’s eligibility for duty-free trade under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) amid the country’s growing support for U.S. adversaries and other trade and corruption concerns.

• Stripping access: AGOA can provide sub-Saharan African countries with duty-free access to the U.S. market for thousands of products. However, to be eligible, countries must meet criteria related to the rule of law, trade and investment policy, combating corruption, and U.S. foreign policy interests. Based on an annual interagency eligibility review, the Trump administration announced on November 2 that it intends to end AGOA access for South Africa and Rwanda. Beginning January 1, these nations will be stripped of preferential U.S. market access under the program.
• A pattern of hostility: For years, the African National Congress (ANC), the largest party in South Africa’s governing coalition, has steadily aligned South Africa with America’s adversaries, warn FDD’s Max Meizlish and Daniel Swift. As recently as August 2025, South Africa’s military chief met with top security officials in Tehran to deepen cooperation. Around the same time, reports emerged of secret government agreements involving Chinese-funded repairs to various critical South African military infrastructure. Pretoria is also reportedly implicated in scandals involving U.S.-sanctioned vessels and aircraft tied to Russia’s defense sector.
• Holding Pretoria accountable: “The ANC is unlikely to deviate from its anti-American posture absent sustained attention from Washington,” Meizlish and Swift explain. They suggest applying the Global Magnitsky Act to ANC officials involved in corruption. Following the AGOA termination, the U.S. could further seek to re-add South Africa to the Financial Action Task Force gray list and “demand greater accountability for the country’s significant illicit finance problems,” Meizlish recommends.