Below is FDD Action’s guide to critical provisions we support in the House and Senate versions of the must-pass annual NDAA for Fiscal Year 2027.
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FDD Action strongly supports multiple provisions in the House and Senate versions of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2027 (H.R. 8800 / S. 4784).
FDD Action also urges Members of Congress to support the topline of approximately $1.14 trillion authorized for national defense in both bills. That is the same level requested by the administration and roughly $250 billion above the amount authorized for FY 2026.
Below is a comprehensive overview of provisions FDD Action has endorsed, organized by issue. While FDD Action supports all the provisions identified below, we’ve noted where especially critical provisions have our strong support.
Note: The provisions below also include those in the Senate manager’s amendment (S. Amdt. 6691) submitted on July 14, 2026. The House passed its version of the NDAA on July 22, 2026; the Senate version awaits further floor action.
Iran remains the foremost driver of instability in the Middle East. Tehran has fortified its nuclear sites, disrupted shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, armed its proxies, and brutally repressed its own people. The regime is behind sabotage plots, cyberattacks, and hybrid operations against Israel, the United States, and regional allies. The provisions in this section deepen U.S.-Israel defense cooperation and give the Pentagon additional tools to deter and degrade the regime and its proxies.
The American and Israeli strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities have set back the regime’s most dangerous capability and demonstrated that American red lines carry consequences. However, Iran’s retaliation in the Strait of Hormuz and attacks on U.S. forces underscore the need for continued pressure on the regime. These provisions sustain the regional air and missile defense network, help cut Tehran off from its proxies, and raise the cost of its assassination schemes.
This provision extends conditions on assistance to Iraqi security forces to guard against diversion to Iran-aligned militias operating inside Iraq’s formal security structure.
This provision prohibits U.S. funding to Iran’s oldest and most powerful Iraqi proxy militia, which coordinates directly with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Iran’s proxy in Lebanon, Hezbollah.
Strengthening these defenses is critical to countering Iran’s expanding ballistic missile and drone arsenal. The House provision updates the U.S.-led command and control strategy by incorporating lessons from recent Iranian attacks. The Senate provision requires an assessment of current capabilities and a strategy to deepen regional cooperation on acquisition, production, and interceptor replenishment.
This provision authorizes and directs assistance to the Lebanese Armed Forces specifically tied to degrading Hezbollah’s military infrastructure.
The DETERRENCE Act increases criminal penalties for individuals involved in assassination schemes in the United States on behalf of foreign adversaries like Iran. These amplified punishments aim to hold accountable and deter criminals who participate in these foreign schemes.
Continued investment in the U.S.-Israel military partnership and technological innovation pays dividends for U.S. national security. As Israel faces threats from Iran and violent terrorist groups, it creates and fields cutting-edge technologies that enhance U.S. military operations and safeguard U.S. servicemembers. Israel also augments America’s force posture in the region by hosting air assets and stockpiles of materiel critical for rapidly responding to emerging threats.
From cybersecurity and AI to electronic warfare, these provisions expand and accelerate bilateral defense technology research, development, testing, evaluation, and industrial cooperation.
This prepositioned stockpile allows the United States to act rapidly in the Middle East unencumbered by what could otherwise be lengthy supply and logistics delays. Its extension and modernization ensure its future use for sustaining U.S. military operations and Israel’s security.
This provision continues monitoring of subterranean tunnels used for terrorism and places additional emphasis on joint efforts to destroy and counter them.
This provision supports efforts to cooperate on addressing drone threats in the air, land, and sea domains.
This provision requires a study and report on international security measures implemented on the Gaza-Egypt border, examining mechanisms for preventing smuggling, weapons transfers, and other security threats in the region.
This provision establishes a defense cooperation initiative with Abraham Accords signatories and other countries normalizing relations with Israel. Not only would it help build a unified regional architecture against Iran, but it would also incentivize other Arab nations to normalize relations.
This provision allocates $50 million to support defense collaboration between the two countries on initiatives such as AI, automation, cybersecurity, and directed energy.
This provision requires a report on ways to enhance communication and coordination on defense-industrial prioritization for the joint production and delivery of defense-critical items.
Co-developing and co-producing missile defense systems like Iron Dome, David’s Sling, and Arrow-3 represents a shared strategic investment in defending against threats ranging from short-range rockets to long-range ballistic missiles. This provision authorizes $20 million for Iron Dome, $30 million for David’s Sling, and $150 million for the Arrow-3 interceptor.
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) remains the most significant long-term strategic challenge to U.S. national security. This year’s NDAA addresses that threat from a military perspective by hardening Taiwan’s defense-industrial base and strengthening U.S. regional deterrence. It also addresses the threat with economic tools by closing the export control gaps that Beijing has exploited to access American AI and semiconductors.
The United States is in a global AI arms race with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). America’s cutting-edge chips and advanced technology should not power the AI systems that support China’s military and security state.
This provision requires annual DOD reports assessing how advanced U.S.-origin AI chips acquired by China contribute to its military capabilities and threaten U.S. AI leadership, including policy recommendations.
These provisions address vulnerabilities that allow Beijing to access the chips critical to America’s AI advantage. The MATCH Act aligns allied export controls to block China’s indigenous production of advanced AI chips. The Chip Security Act requires advanced chip manufacturers to implement security measures to prevent America’s advanced AI chips from being diverted to our adversaries. The AI OVERWATCH Act strengthens congressional oversight over the export of America’s most advanced chips.
Taiwan security cooperation is a vital component of the U.S. strategy to deter Chinese aggression and enhance the island’s defense capabilities. Strengthening bilateral defense ties and supporting Taiwan’s military readiness help maintain peace, stability, and a free and open Indo-Pacific region.
These provisions authorize new funding to this existing DOD initiative. The House version simply authorizes up to $1 billion for FY27. The Senate version authorizes up to $1.5 billion for FY27 and reshapes the program, renaming it the First Island Chain initiative, extending it to the Philippines, and extending the authority to the end of 2032.
This provision tasks the Defense Innovation Unit with aligning U.S. and Taiwanese defense-industrial priorities and deepening the industrial base cooperation necessary to sustain Taiwan’s self-defense production during a crisis.
This provision establishes a joint Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) program to co-develop defense technologies with Taiwan, building on prior uncrewed-systems cooperation.
This provision extends the annual reporting requirement for a joint report by the secretaries of State and Defense on Taiwan’s military capabilities, technological developments, and intelligence support needs.
This provision strengthens Taiwan’s cyber resilience by requiring a strategy to support Taiwan’s cyber defense through Five Eyes coordination, including multilateral cyber-defense exercises.
Modeled on the decades-old stockpile prepositioned in Israel, the stockpile this provision establishes in Taiwan addresses concerns that the island could be cut off from resupply during a Chinese blockade.
This provision establishes a Director of National Intelligence-led task force uniting U.S. intelligence agencies to detect and warn of potential Chinese military aggression against Taiwan. This would centralize early-warning efforts to prevent a strategic surprise.
These provisions establish a PRC Sanctions Task Force to identify sanctions targets should China attempt a military or political takeover of Taiwan.
Chinese-made devices and components in U.S. supply chains pose significant risks to national security and critical infrastructure by giving Beijing a foothold for cyberattacks and interference. The U.S. government has begun implementing restrictions to mitigate these risks and reduce reliance on Chinese technology in critical sectors. These provisions continue that mission.
This provision prohibits DOD from buying solar panels and inverters from Chinese and other foreign entities of concern, reducing supply chain reliance on adversary-made energy equipment.
This provision requires the Pentagon to determine whether certain PRC-made ground robots operating on U.S. networks pose an unacceptable risk to U.S. national security or safety. This determination would set the stage for more aggressive policy action, if needed.
These provisions prohibit DOD from procuring or using optical fiber produced by PRC entities in the department’s information networks and communications systems. The Senate provision goes beyond the House’s to extend the prohibition to all DOD contractors and subcontractors.
This provision prohibits DOD from acquiring modems or routers from companies owned or controlled by the Chinese government.
This provision bars the intelligence community from using any blacklisted Chinese entities’ products or services and extends an FBI-only procurement restriction on Chinese IT products to the entire intelligence community.
This provision establishes congressional findings on the national security risk posed by Chinese-manufactured connected-vehicle technology, laying the groundwork for future restrictions on these vehicles.
The CCP’s malign activities around the world run counter to the security, prosperity, and freedom of America and its allies and partners. These provisions will help protect against these threats.
The Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI) is a critical DOD framework designed to bolster deterrence capabilities against China’s growing military assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific region. This provision extends PDI’s investments in combat-ready forces, infrastructure resilience, and allied interoperability across the Indo-Pacific.
These provisions prevent the sunset of DOD’s annual report on China’s military modernization and strategic posture. The House version improves the report by expanding it to cover the Chinese military’s complicity in forced labor, the role of Chinese cyber capabilities in a conflict with the United States and Taiwan, Chinese biotechnology developments, and Chinese military cooperation with U.S. adversaries. Meanwhile, the Senate version extends the reporting requirement further, to 2032.
These provisions would expand and clarify the definitions and criteria for evaluating which entities the Secretary of Defense determines to be a Chinese Military Company (CMC). They would also extend the annual reporting requirement for these identified CMCs through 2035.
The provision, which passed the House by voice vote in June 2026, requires a report examining the penetration by Chinese and Russian elements and their assets into Georgia, as well as the development of a five-year U.S. strategy to enhance bilateral relations with Georgia and determine whether the United States should continue to invest in its partnership with Georgia.
This provision requires DOD to develop a strategy for coordinating cyber defense efforts with allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region through 2040.
This provision directs DOD to report on Cuba’s military and intelligence activities in the Western Hemisphere. This includes its regional facilities and relationships, cooperation with China, and terrorist-group ties.
This provision requires DOD to, within 90 days of enactment, begin the actions needed to bring the Aegis Guam System to full operational capability by September 30, 2030. That includes two AN/TPY–6 radars for 360-degree sensor coverage of Guam against Chinese threats.
These provisions protect undersea cable infrastructure from Chinese interference by enhancing international engagement on these cables’ security, installation, maintenance, and repair.
Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine continues to threaten European security, undermine democratic governance, and weaken the international order. These provisions sustain critical military assistance to Ukraine, authorize sanctions on the shadow fleet transporting Russia’s sanctioned oil, and further U.S.-Ukraine defense cooperation. Supporting Ukraine’s defense and bolstering European allies are essential to deterring further Russian aggression.
Ukraine needs sustained support to repel Russia’s invasion, and its battlefield innovations provide useful lessons for the U.S. military. These provisions extend and expand the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI), identify Ukrainian drone and counter-drone technologies for joint development, and assess how Ukraine’s operational practices apply to U.S. forces.
By identifying Ukrainian unmanned systems and counter-drone technologies for co-development, co-production, and rapid U.S. acquisition, this joint working group would allow the United States to quickly benefit from Ukraine’s battlefield innovation and ensure both countries are equipped to confront emerging threats.
This provision extends USAI through 2029 and nearly doubles authorized annual funding to $750 million, providing sustained military assistance and expanded capabilities for Ukrainian forces.
This provision establishes a task force to identify, evaluate, and synthesize operational practices and defense strategies employed by Ukraine and assess their applicability to U.S. military operations.
Russia has fueled its campaign of violence and malign influence in the region through a variety of deceptive practices to evade sanctions, resist international pressure, and cover up its brutal and unlawful conduct in its war on Ukraine. Targeting the financial streams that enable this behavior and illuminating the scale of its atrocities would degrade its war strategy on both fronts.
This provision requires quarterly DOD reports detailing all military-to-military exchanges and contacts between DOD and the Russian government, including assessments of the benefits each side expects to gain.
This report would help expose how Russia’s attacks on Ukraine’s religious life are part of a deliberate campaign to destroy Ukrainian culture and identity.
Russia evades Western sanctions through a shadow fleet of oil tankers that helps it sell oil, acquire military equipment, and bankroll its war machine. This provision authorizes sanctions on shadow fleet vessels, owners, operators, insurers, and facilitators.
Russia is testing NATO’s resolve. These provisions incentivize NATO allies to invest in their defense by factoring defense spending into U.S. arms sales decisions. They also keep Congress closely involved in any drawdown of U.S. forces in Europe to enhance NATO’s deterrent posture against Russia.
This provision requires DOD to consider whether a NATO member meets the 2% defense-spending benchmark when approving arms sales and weapon-system transfers.
These provisions would keep Congress closely involved in any decision to scale back U.S. forces in Europe. They would limit cuts to troops, equipment, and facilities until the Pentagon justifies them, and they would require a report and an independent GAO review of the analysis behind posture changes made since January 20, 2025.
A global conflict with a major military power like China would quickly strain U.S. munitions and expose vulnerable bases and logistics networks. These provisions help scale up defense production, protect military installations and supply chains, and deepen defense cooperation with allies and partners.
The U.S. industrial base is not producing munitions and weapons at the speed or scale a major conflict would demand. These provisions give industry the steady demand and broader supply base needed to ramp up production while reducing costs and delivery timelines.
This provision sets minimum inventory levels for Air Force fighter aircraft and authorizes increased procurement of F-15EX jets.
These provisions direct DOD to fast-track acquiring lower-cost alternative weapons across multiple categories including missile systems, air defense interceptors, and autonomous systems.
This provision fast-tracks the approval of new solid rocket motor suppliers and requires that certain munitions draw their motors from at least two suppliers.
This provision requires projected FMS demand to be factored into industrial base assessments, munitions production planning, and sustainment and capacity decisions. This would help expand production capacity, stabilize critical suppliers, and incentivize capital investment in defense production.
These provisions authorize multiyear procurement for more than 35 distinct munitions, missiles, platforms, and component systems. The committees should adopt the broadest version of this authority in each case and reconcile differences in contract-length caps and certification requirements to preserve executive branch flexibility and congressional oversight.
This provision requires a report on increased maximum production capacity for each authorized munition and weapon system in House §§ 1839 and 1840, improving congressional oversight.
This provision requires DOD to consider alternative designs, such as low-cost and mass-produced munitions, when meeting its requirements for major munitions programs.
Adversaries can disrupt U.S. military operations by targeting the power, navigation, logistics, and sensor networks the force relies on. These provisions require DOD to find and fix vulnerabilities in those networks and keep Chinese military-linked carriers out of its logistics chain.
This provision requires motor carriers hauling DOD cargo to certify they are not owned or controlled by Chinese military companies.
This provision directs the Secretary of Defense to have combatant commanders incorporate the security of critical infrastructure and its control systems into defense planning, training, and readiness exercises.
This provision requires an accelerated modernization of the GPS enterprise to enhance its resilience and security, given its centrality to U.S. national security and commerce.
This provision requires DOD to report on its strategy for fielding resilient, distributed missile defense sensors that can survive attacks and degradations.
This provision requires assessments of military bases heavily tied to commercial logistics and transportation and mandates risk-based mitigation plans to protect critical logistics nodes from attacks that could disrupt military readiness.
This provision requires DOD to submit a plan to find and remove remotely accessible power grid equipment owned or controlled by foreign adversaries like China, focusing on the power supply to military bases and defense infrastructure.
Allies and partners extend U.S. deterrence against our adversaries beyond America’s borders. These provisions strengthen those partnerships by easing technology transfers, expanding military cooperation, and pushing back on ICC warrants against U.S. and allied personnel.
These provisions raise the $20 million annual cap on DOD support to foreign and irregular forces that facilitate U.S. irregular warfare operations to $50 million (House) or $30 million (Senate). The Senate version also adds oversight requirements for sensitive activities.
This provision authorizes DOD to establish partnership programs with foreign militaries on military trauma care and research.
This provision urges the secretaries of Defense and State to press partner nations at major ally forums not to enforce International Criminal Court (ICC) warrants against U.S. and allied military personnel.
This provision makes Missile Technology Control Regime-controlled missile technology, including guided weapons and hypersonics, eligible for license-free transfer to Australia and the UK under the existing AUKUS exemption.
This provision directs DOD to submit a plan to enhance U.S. defense cooperation with Morocco, consistent with the April 2026 U.S.-Morocco Defense Cooperation Roadmap, which DOD must also submit to Congress.
Preventing DOD procurement from foreign entities of concern and adversaries safeguards military operations, sensitive infrastructure, and domestic innovation. To accomplish this, the department must first identify its vulnerabilities from dependencies on critical suppliers to cybersecurity risks. These provisions work to enhance visibility into defense supply chains and lay the groundwork for measures to reduce those dependencies.
China dominates the global display industry. This assessment would reveal where U.S. weapons systems and platforms are vulnerable to supply chain disruptions, whether due to overdependence on adversaries like China or on at-risk countries like Taiwan. It would also recommend ways to reduce foreign dependence.
This provision requires DOD to assess risk to its medical supply chain, flag products dependent on China for key ingredients, and report strategies to reduce that reliance.
This provision adds certification requirements to an existing strategy aimed at reducing DOD dependence on foreign sourcing of computer displays, particularly from nations of concern.
This provision requires establishing a pilot program to evaluate hardware and software to counter the impact of foreign actors on critical equipment in U.S. supply chains.
This provision requires DOD to study and report to Congress on whether to require contractors selling defense systems to submit “bills of materials,” detailed inventories of the systems’ software, hardware, AI, and cryptography, to improve supply-chain security in defense acquisition.
Smart devices rely on cellular modules to connect to the internet, but China dominates the global market for these modules. This provision addresses that supply chain risk by requiring regular DOD-wide audits to identify Chinese-made cellular modules and reports on steps to remove them and/or mitigate the associated risks.
This provision creates a fast-track process to approve backup suppliers for defense parts, easing single-source dependence and strengthening supply-chain resilience, with guaranteed contracts for suppliers that share full technical data.
U.S. economic security and national security are inextricably linked. These provisions help maintain and strengthen U.S. innovation, safeguard supply chains, and preserve our technological edge in defense. Protecting U.S. intellectual property from foreign adversaries is critical to America’s national security and position as the arsenal of democracy. At the same time, combating drug cartels and narcotics trafficking is vital to prosperity and security at home.
This provision bars the Pentagon from contracting for payment processing equipment or services with retailers that rely on technology controlled by a foreign adversary. It also requires a review of whether existing DOD retailers providing payment processing use this covered technology and forces them to drop it, if so. This would help prevent adversaries from accessing sensitive information.
This provision directs DOD to designate an office to identify and manage risks from foreign adversary investment in the defense industrial base. The office would monitor ownership changes, share risk data with contractors, and flag hidden adversary stakes in suppliers.
This provision bars DOD from contracting with companies unless they agree not to buy back stock, pay dividends to shareholders, or make other capital distributions. The Secretary can waive this for contractors that commit to an approved defense-investment plan.
By codifying DOD’s Economic Defense Unit, defining its mission, clarifying its authorities, and ensuring congressional oversight, this provision empowers Washington to fight back against China’s economic warfare.
This provision provides a ten-year extension of the Office of Strategic Capital’s capital assistance pilot program, which uses loans and loan guarantees to steer private investment toward defense-critical technologies.
This provision requires quarterly briefings on the Economic Defense Unit’s activities. It restricts DOD funding for the unit until the first briefing is provided, the Secretary of Defense submits a review of all DOD equity investments, and the Secretary certifies that DOD holds no board seats or voting control in any entity where it holds equity.
By extending the public-disclosure rule that has long applied to ocean shipping to include aircraft, truck, and rail manifests, this provision closes a smuggling loophole exploited for sanctions evasion, drug trafficking, and the movement of goods made with forced labor.
This provision renames the USAID Inspector General as the Inspector General for Foreign Assistance, housed in the State Department, and expands its jurisdiction to all non-defense foreign assistance.
China dominates the processing of the minerals used in U.S. munitions, sensors, magnets, and batteries, and has shown a willingness to use export restrictions as coercive leverage. These provisions improve visibility into where those materials originate and test whether DOD’s procurement authorities should extend to other agencies and to combatant commanders.
This provision directs the Defense Logistics Agency to establish a pilot program to develop systems for tracing critical minerals from extraction to end use. This would help the Pentagon rapidly mobilize and allocate critical minerals in an emergency.
These provisions strengthen U.S. critical minerals security by decentralizing procurement and management authorities. Specifically, they require studies on the feasibility of granting executive agencies government-wide authority to procure and resell critical minerals and of enabling combatant commanders to independently acquire and dispose of them for operational resilience.
Drug cartels and traffickers threaten American lives and U.S. economic prosperity, often with help from Chinese money launderers and precursor chemical suppliers. These provisions extend sanctions on traffickers and expose cartels’ capabilities and operations.
This provision requires a report on the military power and illicit activities of drug cartels sanctioned for terrorism or drug trafficking, as well as recommendations to disrupt them. This report would inform lawmakers about the cartels that fuel opioid deaths and regional instability.
This provision extends the Fentanyl Sanctions Act through 2033, ensuring law enforcement and sanctions officials continue to have the additional authorities to punish those involved in synthetic opioid trafficking.
China and other adversaries are probing U.S. networks and critical infrastructure, challenging American AI dominance, and advancing their geopolitical aims through information warfare. These provisions strengthen DOD’s cyber defenses, grow its cyber workforce, secure American AI against adversary exploitation, and sharpen America’s information operations posture.
Adversaries target DOD networks and the contractors that support them, seeking any point of entry. These provisions strengthen DOD’s ability to detect, share, and assess cyber threats across its networks and the defense industrial base.
This provision allows DOD to mitigate cyber threats early by requiring operationally critical contractors to quickly report cyber incidents to the Pentagon. These contractors must also report any hardware, software, firmware, or embedded technology tied to a PRC entity within 72 hours of discovery.
This provision requires DOD to submit reports on the Cyber Operational Readiness Assessment program, which gauges how well DOD networks can withstand, contain, and recover from cyberattacks. These reports would identify what vulnerabilities were found, explain how they are being fixed, and assess operational resilience.
This provision requires DOD to assess and report the risks that foreign adversary-controlled digital platforms, such as social media apps like TikTok, pose to operational security, force protection, military personnel, and military installations.
Beyond reauthorizing the law, this provision updates the cybersecurity information-sharing framework to reflect changes in the cyber threat environment.
This provision lets Cyber Command coordinate with private-sector companies beyond the tech sector, extends the program through 2031, and adds a prioritization report.
This provision creates a grant program to help small businesses and new defense contractors afford cybersecurity certifications required to do business with DOD.
Defending DOD networks against today’s cyber threats requires a skilled, well-organized, and properly equipped cyber workforce. These provisions build DOD’s cyber talent pipeline, test ways to surge expertise during crises, and review whether its cyber leaders have the authorities they need.
This provision directs DOD to run a small pilot program evaluating whether to establish a civilian cybersecurity reserve corps that could surge expert civilian manpower during major cyber incidents.
This provision requires an independent study of the services’ top cyber advisors, including how they’re organized and whether they have the authorities needed to effectively protect DOD networks.
This provision expands DOD’s cyber scholarship program to include training in operational technology (industrial control systems).
This provision establishes a pilot program pairing DOD cyber units with leading universities to improve military cyber training and create direct pathways for graduates into federal cyber careers.
Adversaries are siphoning capabilities from America’s top AI models and using their own AI products to advance their broader political aims. These provisions keep adversaries’ AI out of DOD systems, secure the AI the department does use, and punish Chinese efforts to copy America’s top models.
This provision strengthens the existing ban on DeepSeek and related AI in DOD systems by requiring the Secretary of Defense to issue guidance on identifying AI companies of concern and removing their products. It further gives contractors 90 days after that guidance is issued to comply.
This provision requires DOD to develop and issue binding security standards by December 2027 for its AI agents.
These provisions protect American AI use from foreign adversary threats by requiring AI outputs to disclose their sources, including foreign propaganda, and requiring DOD contractors that sell AI goods and services to submit an inventory of each system’s software, data, and hardware.
As Chinese entities use model extraction attacks to distill the capabilities of America’s top AI models, this provision would expose and punish those actors, safeguarding America’s AI dominance.
While our adversaries treat the information environment as a continuous theater of military and political operations, U.S. authorities are too centralized to compete. These provisions build the doctrine, organizational home, and delegated authority the Department needs to compete at the speed the environment demands. They also renew support for tools that circumvent authoritarian censorship.
These provisions strengthen America’s ability to go on the offensive in the information environment. Sec. 1054 establishes an Army Information Operations Center of Excellence for advancing information operations across operational and tactical levels. Sec. 1089C requires a feasibility study on whether lower-level commanders should have authority to approve tactical information operations. Sec. 1099 requires the Secretary of Defense to determine whether to designate information as a warfighting domain alongside land, air, sea, space, and cyber.
This provision reauthorizes the Open Technology Fund, which supports internet freedom worldwide.
Foreign powers are investing heavily in lobbying efforts, purchasing influence at universities, and obscuring their information operations to sway public sentiment. They seek to use this influence to erode America’s military readiness, defense industrial base, political cohesion, and alliances. These provisions take steps to expose and counter these influence campaigns.
This provision conditions DOD-connected education funding on schools severing ties with Confucius Institutes and Classrooms linked to the Chinese Communist Party, closing a vector for influencing the next generation.
This legislative package tackles foreign adversary influence on U.S. national security policymaking. The REVOKE Act revokes security clearances for individuals who have lobbied on behalf of Chinese military companies. The PAID OFF Act closes loopholes that allow unregistered agents of foreign adversaries to lobby in the United States. The CLEAR Path Act expands existing State Department post-employment restrictions to ban agency heads, deputies, and Senate-confirmed officials from lobbying for foreign adversaries.
These provisions prevent U.S. adversaries from infiltrating university research programs and accessing sensitive defense-related innovation. Sec. 220 codifies a research security program to protect DOD-funded research and bars DOD-funded universities from contracting with adversary entities. Sec. 224 extends a prohibition on using DOD funds for university research collaborations with blacklisted foreign institutions.
This provision requires more DOD contractors to disclose foreign influence by applying current requirements to report foreign ownership, control, or influence to DOD contracts and subcontracts starting at $500,000 in value.
FDD Action is a non-profit, non-partisan 501(c)(4) organization established to advocate for effective policies to promote U.S. national security and defend free nations. FDD Action serves as a trusted resource for congressional offices and executive branch policymakers navigating complex national security challenges, leveraging a team with decades of experience on Capitol Hill and in the policy arena.