

June 17, 2026

The Honorable Mike Johnson  
Speaker of the House  
U.S. House of Representatives

The Honorable John Thune  
Majority Leader  
United States Senate

The Honorable Hakeem Jeffries  
Minority Leader  
U.S. House of Representatives

The Honorable Chuck Schumer  
Minority Leader  
United States Senate

**RE: Request for Inclusion of AI Export Control Provisions in the FY2027 NDAA**

Dear Speaker Johnson, Leader Jeffries, Leader Thune, and Leader Schumer:

We write to urge inclusion of five AI export control provisions in the FY2027 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). Together, they would close critical gaps in US export controls and protect America's leadership in artificial intelligence (AI), a technology posed to reshape critical industries and national security alike.

This effort is inseparable from America's competition with the People's Republic of China (PRC) and, more specifically, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Beijing sees AI not as a tool to expand human potential but to constrain its tightening monopoly on political power, censoring and surveilling its citizens, and shaping the information environment to fit the party's advantage. Those ambitions make US leadership in AI an urgent national security priority.

AI competitiveness rests on compute, energy, talent, data, and diffusion. Of these, compute is foundational; without access to the most advanced chips, no one can build or deploy frontier AI systems. Here, the United States holds a lead. Semiconductor manufacturing equipment (SME) controls from the first Trump administration denied China the tools to manufacture leading-edge chips, and the Biden administration extended those controls to the chips themselves. Both policies have limited the competitiveness of PRC AI labs.

But that chip lead is vulnerable. Through smuggling, remote cloud access, indigenous production enabled by weak allied controls, and distillation attacks, China is working to catch up. Left unaddressed, these efforts will erase an advantage built over years and make the race far harder to win. The United States and its allies, not the CCP, should shape the future of AI. As Congress considers the NDAA this year, these five measures are critical national security priorities:

**1. Strengthen Export Controls on Advanced AI Chips (H.R. 6875/S.4456)**

The United States should strengthen export controls on advanced semiconductors capable of training or running frontier AI models. Existing controls have been essential, but they have been

weakened over the past year.<sup>1</sup> This is concerning, given the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) ambition to leverage AI for counter-missile defense scenarios, drone warfare, and psychological operations.<sup>2</sup> The U.S. government should not export capabilities that adversaries could leverage to kill Americans, nor should Washington sell high-end chips to the PRC that China's own companies cannot fabricate. We support treating AI chip exports like foreign military sales, subject to congressional review.

## **2. Restrict China's Remote Access to American AI Compute (H.R. 2683/S.3519)**

Export controls on physical chip exports are necessary but insufficient. CCP-controlled entities can, and have, remotely accessed American AI compute through cloud platforms.<sup>3</sup> This pathway effectively allows China to use cutting-edge American semiconductors to train and run AI models without importing a single chip. Accordingly, we support policies that prohibit PRC-affiliated entities from accessing advanced American AI compute through remote or cloud-based channels, require U.S. cloud and AI infrastructure providers to implement know-your-customer controls, and establish clear enforcement authority to close this pathway definitively.

## **3. Prevent China from Stealing or Smuggling U.S. AI Chips (H.R. 3447/S.1705)**

Restricted U.S. semiconductors have been found in Chinese military systems and in the inventories of entities operating under the CCP's control.<sup>4</sup> In some cases, these chips were acquired illegally via theft or smuggling through shell companies in third-party countries.<sup>5</sup> We support policies that would mandate location verification for advanced AI chips and enforce mandatory reporting for companies about potential diversion to restricted entities.

## **4. Block China's Ability to Develop Indigenous Advanced AI Chips (H.R. 8170/S.4281)**

SME controls on extreme ultraviolet lithography (EUV) have successfully blocked Beijing from fabricating cutting-edge chips, but China retains deep ultraviolet immersion lithography (DUV) tools. That access lets companies like Huawei design capable if less efficient chips and lets CXMT and YMTC produce memory chips that could displace U.S. and allied supply, risking introducing CCP-controlled chips, hardware and kill switches into U.S. data centers. This gap stems largely from permissive allied export controls. In response, we support aligning allied DUV export control restrictions and our own.

## **5. Deter Distillation Attacks on American AI Models (H.R. 8283)**

China is also pursuing AI model theft through distillation attacks using large-scale queries to extract and replicate the capabilities of U.S. models built at great cost. We support the imposition of sanctions and other penalties that make such attacks cost more than they yield.

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<sup>1</sup> <https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/us-eases-regulations-nvidia-h200-chip-exports-china-2026-01-13/>

<sup>2</sup> <https://content.striderintel.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/Strider-SCSP-China-AI-Infrastructure-Surge-Report.pdf>

<sup>3</sup> <https://www.reuters.com/technology/chinese-entities-turn-amazon-cloud-its-rivals-access-high-end-us-chips-ai-2024-08-23/>

<sup>4</sup> <https://www.nytimes.com/2026/06/01/business/economy/china-military-nvidia-chips.html>, <https://www.cnbc.com/2025/12/31/160-million-export-controlled-nvidia-gpus-allegedly-smuggled-to-china.html>

<sup>5</sup> <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/newsletters/2025-12-23/us-probes-nvidia-s-biggest-chip-buyer-in-southeast-asia-for-smuggling?embedded-checkout=true>

## **Conclusion**

These provisions are among the most consequential national security tools available to Congress. America's lead is real but fragile. It is the product of deliberate policy that require sustained congressional leadership to maintain. We respectfully urge their inclusion in this year's NDAA and stand ready to support your efforts to advance them.

Sincerely,

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The Honorable Roger F. Wicker, Chairman  
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