President Trump delivers remarks to the 81st session of the United Nations General Assembly, New York City, Sept. 22, 2026. (Official White House Photo by Daniel Torok)

1. President Trump told the UN this week that he has a “big decision to make” in the U.S.-Iran war as Tehran sends mixed signals toward a deal and the United States increasingly holds the upper hand in the conflict.

• A fork in the road: Addressing the UN General Assembly (UNGA) on Tuesday, Trump laid out a stark choice between striking a deal that lets Iran rebuild and moving to “annihilate the Islamic Republic” if the regime refuses. The President’s speech came a day after Tehran threatened to change the “weaponry and the geography of the war” if the U.S. launches a new offensive. As threats were traded, Trump revealed his envoys met the Iranian delegation for three hours on the sidelines of the UNGA, adding that there is “a lot of momentum for them to make a deal.” Whether or not the talks produce a deal, Washington is negotiating from a position of strength.
• Washington holds the cards: The President’s confident tone as he delivered his terms reflected that the administration is playing a strong hand, explains FDD’s Behnam Ben Taleblu. This is thanks to the economic, political, and military leverage Washington has accumulated over the last few months, he adds. The United States has halted Iranian crude shipments through a maritime blockade while targeting Tehran’s illicit network of foreign enablers through sanctions. This one-two punch handicaps the regime’s efforts to move money and generate revenue. That leverage means Trump “has time to explore his options and position the United States to capitalize on any Iranian misstep or overreach, whether at the negotiating table or on the battlefield,” Taleblu notes.
• Don’t ease the pressure: Sanctions produced the regime’s chronic economic weakness, and the blockade delivered a further acute shock, explains FDD’s Miad Maleki. Now, Washington should press that advantage by closing off what commerce with Iran remains. That means cutting off the gold and hard-currency supply the Treasury Department alleges runs through Turkey, recommends Maleki. It also means targeting the Iraq-based banks and exchange houses that allegedly move dollars to Tehran under cover of trade. Maleki also urges Washington to pursue quiet diplomacy with Beijing to keep Chinese firms out of Iran’s rebuild.
• The vise tightens: Washington saw its economic pressure against Iran pay off on multiple fronts this week. In the skies, Treasury’s secondary sanctions on Iran’s aviation sector took effect, prompting a growing list of countries, including Oman, Azerbaijan and Georgia, to ground Iranian carriers. The sanctions will sting Iran, which FDD’s Mark Dubowitz and Maleki note uses its airlines to fly “cash, weapon components and foreign fighters.” Meanwhile, on the financial front, the UAE barred local branches of Iran’s U.S.-sanctioned Bank Melli from all transactions to and from Iran weeks after Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent demanded that every Bank Melli branch worldwide be shut down. But the job is unfinished, Maleki warns, as the bank still operates branches in Oman and Azerbaijan – the same countries turning away Iranian flights. Moreover, “the next enforcement test is preventing these transactions from being rerouted through third-country intermediaries,” he adds.
• End the war on U.S. terms: This week, House Speaker Mike Johnson (R-LA) hailed the U.S. campaign against Iran for ensuring that the regime does not have a nuclear capability but also called for “a resolution” to the war. The fastest way to end the conflict to America’s advantage is to intensify pressure on Tehran and its facilitators, not relieve it. Lawmakers from both parties have pushed that effort recently, including Sen. Elissa Slotkin (D-MI) and Rep. John Moolenaar (R-MI), who each wrote to Trump ahead of his summit with Chinese President Xi Jinping. They urged him to confront Beijing over satellite imagery from Chinese companies linked to Iran’s July strike that killed three U.S. service members in Jordan. Washington should press that case while tightening the economic pressure already squeezing the regime.

Secretary Marco Rubio meets with Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Foreign Minister Faisal Bin Farhan in Manama, Bahrain, Jun. 25, 2026. (Official State Department photo by Freddie Everett)

2. The Houthis are consolidating their gains along Yemen’s coastline and pushing eastward, advancing another front in Iran’s war against the United States, one Washington cannot ignore.

• Houthis on the move: Earlier this month, the Iran-backed Houthi organization Ansar Allah, a U.S.-designated terrorist group, captured critical positions along Yemen’s west coast, giving the group greater control over the Bab al-Mandeb, a Red Sea chokepoint it can use to block shipping. The group has since fortified its coastal gains and is pushing eastward into the highlands of the Taiz governorate, positioning it to isolate Taiz city, one of Yemen’s most populous cities and a gateway that links Yemen’s south to its west coast and north. The Houthis’ advances come as Iran-backed Iraqi militias reportedly attacked Saudi Arabia’s East-West Pipeline, forcing it to shut down. The pipeline, which lets Riyadh bypass the Strait of Hormuz by sending millions of oil barrels to the Red Sea, restarted on September 22 at a reduced rate. Its closure, alongside the Houthi advance, pushed oil prices higher.
• The bigger picture: In response to the Houthis’ gains, Saudi Arabia requested American airstrikes multiple times this month. However, President Trump declined, preferring to focus on Iran itself and the Strait of Hormuz. “But the conflict in Yemen is not a different war; it’s another front in Tehran’s fight against the United States,” explains FDD’s Bridget Toomey. Despite Houthi attempts to portray the group’s advance as part of a domestic struggle, its operations are also tied to Iran’s broader campaign. In late July, Saudi Arabia assessed that Iran-backed Iraqi militias coordinated some strikes on Saudi energy infrastructure with the Houthis under Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps guidance.
• Iran’s play: Tehran is seeing its leverage slip away as Washington gradually restores the flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz. But “letting the Houthis control the Red Sea coast would give Tehran much of its leverage right back,” Toomey notes. By keeping oil prices high, Tehran wants to force an end to the U.S. blockade that deprives it of oil revenue. Blocking exports via Bab al-Mandeb may make that possible despite setbacks in the Gulf, adds Toomey. Tehran, in other words, wants to weaponize Bab al-Mandeb just as it has sought to weaponize the Strait of Hormuz. As an advisor to Iran’s supreme leader put it in April, the regime “views Bab al-Mandeb as it does Hormuz.”
• Washington should step in: This week, the UK agreed to provide defensive military support to Saudi Arabia in the form of air-to-air refueling. Washington can do its part too by isolating the Houthis financially and from weapons supply routes, even if the Trump administration does not want to join in military action against the group. Toomey recommends that Treasury “sanction any financial institutions enabling Houthi access to the international system and front companies that enable the group to procure dual-use technologies.” The administration should also instruct Oman to block Houthi financial access through institutions in Muscat, she adds.

President Trump participates in a trilateral signing ceremony with Danish PM Mette Frederiksen and Greenlandic PM Jens-Frederik Nielsen, New York City, Sept. 22, 2026. (Official White House Photo by Daniel Torok)

1. The United States, Denmark, and Greenland signed a new trilateral security agreement on Tuesday on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly to update and expand U.S. access to Greenland, but more work remains to turn those provisions into a stronger Arctic defense.

• Security agreement: The new agreement preserves existing U.S. access to Greenland and authorizes two new U.S. military sites at Narsarsuaq and Mestersgiv, beyond the single base the United States already operates at Pituffik, which may also expand. The accord also allows for additional sites in the future by mutual agreement and commits Denmark and Greenland to an accelerated review of proposed unmanned installations. In addition, it calls for a greater NATO role in Arctic defense planning, military presence, exercises, and joint intelligence capabilities. To protect against adversarial access, control, or influence over sensitive sectors, the accord also tightens screening of investment from countries outside of NATO and the EU.
• The geostrategic angle: Greenland bridges North American and European defense, FDD’s Emmerson Overell explains. Pituffik already enables missile warning, missile defense, space surveillance, and satellite command and control. The island’s position also makes it crucial for tracking Russian submarines and protecting the sea lanes needed to reinforce Europe, she adds. The agreement’s new locations and support for stronger NATO engagement could reinforce that role, and they come at a critical moment. “Russian submarines can pass through the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) Gap toward vital Atlantic reinforcement routes,” warns Overell. Meanwhile, bombers and ballistic-missile submarines based in Russia’s far north can threaten North America through Arctic approaches. Growing Sino-Russian regional cooperation adds to NATO’s challenge.
• Moving forward: NATO should remain the organizing framework for European Arctic defense, with Nordic allies leading regionally, while NORAD and U.S. NORTHCOM should continue coordinating U.S.-Canadian defense of North America, notes Overell. These efforts should be further aligned with U.S. Navy and NATO anti-submarine operations, Denmark’s growing capabilities, and allied surveillance, logistics, and reinforcement plans. At the same time, the NORAD-led Operation Arctic Vanguard, which recently moved U.S. fighter jets to Greenland with allied support, provides a foundation for broader allied training, Overell advises. To build on it, “NORAD and NORTHCOM should expand NATO participation, with NORTHCOM and NATO adding land and maritime exercises that build toward integrated air, land, and sea operations,” she adds.

President Trump, First Lady Melania Trump, President Xi Jinping, and Madame Peng Liyuan participate in a landmark summit at the White House, Sept. 24, 2026 (@WhiteHouse via X)

2. President Trump hosted Chinese President Xi Jinping for a state visit at the White House Thursday, where the two leaders discussed trade relations and Taiwan, among other issues. The summit came days after the United States, Japan, and South Korea launched new economic security talks.

• The summit: Ahead of Xi’s arrival, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said that both leaders agreed to extend their trade truce by two months. The truce, which ended last year’s trade war, was set to expire in November. Bessent said that the extension will give Washington and Beijing “more time to see what we can do on the economic front.” On Taiwan, Chinese state news agency Xinhua reported that Xi told Trump that he hoped the United States would oppose Taiwanese independence. This would represent a change from America’s longstanding position that it merely does not “support” Taiwanese independence, though there is no sign the administration plans to change its wording. Taiwan’s foreign ministry denounced Xi’s comments as “the consistent Chinese approach of distorting facts and unilaterally conveying its position and claims.”
• Building a bulwark: On Monday, meeting on the sidelines of UN General Assembly, the United States, Japan, and South Korea launched a new economic-security consultation and pledged to resist economic coercion, “non-market policies and practices,” and arbitrary export restrictions. They agreed to strengthen their trilateral supply-chain early warning system and urged closer cooperation on semiconductors, as well as strong protections for technologies including AI and quantum technology. On the Taiwan issue, the three opposed unilateral attempts to change the status quo in the Taiwan Strait and backed Taiwan’s “meaningful participation” in appropriate international organizations.
• Fueling resilience: China has ramped up maritime coercion of Taiwan, with a blockade remaining the most likely scenario the island could face. The most important step Taiwan can take to prepare is securing its energy supply. After an FDD tabletop exercise simulating a Chinese energy quarantine of Taiwan, FDD’s Craig Singleton explained that it was clear, “Taiwan urgently needed to diversify both its energy suppliers and the means by which those supplies reach the island before a crisis.” To that end, Congress should pass the bipartisan Taiwan Energy Security and Anti-Embargo Act (S. 2722 / H.R. 7873). This bill would harden Taiwan against energy coercion by directing the United States to prioritize LNG exports to Taiwan and deepen bilateral energy technology cooperation.

Secretary of State Marco Rubio meets with Serbian Foreign Minister Marko Djuric at the Department of State in Washington, D.C., Aug. 6, 2025. (Official State Department photo by Freddie Everett)

Counter backsliding and foreign influence in Serbia.

Next month, Serbians will head to the polls in a snap parliamentary election on October 25. But the vote’s integrity is at risk, as Serbia’s democratic freedoms have declined under President Aleksandar Vucic and his ruling party. Watchdogs have documented an erosion of electoral integrity, press freedom, and the rule of law. Belgrade has pressured independent media, deployed spyware against critics and journalists, and used force against protesters. Meanwhile, Serbia has welcomed cooperation with U.S. adversaries. It relies on Russian energy and maintains close security and intelligence cooperation with Moscow. It is also building economic, defense, and technological ties with China and diplomatic relations with Iran.

In testimony delivered to the congressional Counter-Kleptocracy Caucus, FDD’s Ivana Stradner explained how the United States can protect Serbia’s institutions and ensure Serbian citizens can determine their political future:

• Sanction those responsible for repression and corruption. Washington should impose financial sanctions and visa restrictions on individuals responsible for corruption, attacks on democratic institutions, political violence, or actions that undermine regional stability.
• Counter U.S. adversary influence. The United States should counter Russian, Chinese, and Iranian influence in Serbia. The country’s position outside the EU sanctions regime, its customs arrangements, and its arms industry have made it a transit point for procurement and re-export schemes. Treasury should designate the front companies moving controlled goods and technology to Russia and Iran, while warning Serbian banks, financial institutions, and logistics firms that they risk secondary sanctions if they knowingly facilitate this trade.
• Pair pressure with a credible offer. Serbia cannot expect the full benefits of partnership with Washington while deepening ties with U.S. adversaries. But pressure alone will not shift Belgrade’s orientation. Washington should offer a visible alternative to Russian and Chinese investment, defined by an open, effective regulatory system that benefits local communities, in contrast to the corrupt institutions through which adversary investment currently flows.

And also…

• Congress should pass the bipartisan, FDD Action-endorsed Supporting the Rule of law, Building Institutional Justice, and Accountability (SRBIJA) Act (H.R. 10183), introduced by Reps. Joe Wilson (R-SC) and Bill Keating (D-MA). As Stradner explains, “this bill draws needed attention to the democratic backsliding and corruption in Serbia and recognizes that Serbia’s strategic orientation and positions on regional stability run counter to U.S. interests.” The bill directs the Secretary of State to cease participation in the U.S.-Serbia Strategic Dialogue unless Belgrade curbs its democratic backsliding and ties to U.S. adversaries, and it conditions further U.S. assistance on Serbia making progress on those fronts.

President Trump delivers remarks to the 81st session of the United Nations General Assembly, New York City, Sept. 22, 2026. (Official White House Photo by Daniel Torok)

🛒 Bulk goods, big problems: On Tuesday, the State Department advised New York-area luxury and wholesale retailers of legal restrictions on Iranian officials buying their goods. The State Department first imposed the restrictions in September 2025 under the Foreign Missions Act. They apply year-round, but the new advisory reminds retailers ahead of this year’s UN General Assembly. It turns out that national security includes protecting America’s favorite $1.50 hot dog.

• The bulk-buying loophole: Costco and other wholesale stores have been a go-to for Iranian diplomats in New York. Nothing says vacation like souvenir shopping, especially to avoid sanctions at home, right? Unfortunately for the Iranians, the State Department is reaffirming these restrictions.
• What’s off limits? In case the membership scanner at the entrance isn’t intimidating enough, the State Department will continue forcing Iranian officials to get approval before buying from a wholesale club, or luxury goods valued over $1,000. So if any Iranian diplomats are looking for goods like watches, cigarettes, or fountain pens, they might be out of luck.
• One week in New York: High-level week at the 81st Session of the UN General Assembly started on Tuesday. Though Iran’s delegation is smaller than last year’s, these shopping restrictions still managed to score a recurring invite. Diplomatic visits increase the risk of sanctions evasion, so hold on tight to that Costco card – this is not the time to lose it.
• Iran being singled out: Iran remains the only country whose diplomats were specifically targeted in this shopping shutdown. Somewhere in New York, a regime official’s wish list just got a lot shorter. The State Department is continuing efforts to restrict regime elites from exploiting diplomatic travel. Apparently, being an Iranian elite doesn’t come with a loyalty card anymore.

📅 Planning ahead: The General Assembly high-level week is scheduled to wrap up in the next few days, so when Iranian officials head home, we’ll plan our bulk shopping accordingly.